# Feltner v. Columbia Pictures: The Jury's Role in Setting Statutory Damages > The Supreme Court held that the Seventh Amendment guarantees a jury trial on statutory copyright damages (including the amount itself), reshaping how infringement awards are decided. Topic: Copyright | Author: Lidiia Levitska | Source: Intellectual Property Law (outsideipcounsel.com) Canonical: https://outsideipcounsel.com/blog/feltner-v-columbia-pictures-jury-trial-statutory-damages/ *Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc.*, 523 U.S. 340 (1998), No. 96-1768, decided March 31, 1998, is the foundational decision on the constitutional architecture of statutory damages under the Copyright Act. Justice Thomas wrote for the Court, holding that the Seventh Amendment provides a right to a jury trial on all issues pertinent to an award of statutory damages under § 504(c), including the *amount* of the award. The decision arose from a dispute over delinquent television-licensing payments and an \$8.8 million award entered by a judge, not a jury. Its reasoning continues to govern how every contested statutory-damages claim is structured. ## At a glance - **Case:** *Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc.*, 523 U.S. 340 (1998), No. 96-1768 - **Decided:** March 31, 1998; Justice Thomas for the Court (Justice Scalia concurring in the judgment) - **Statute:** 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (statutory damages) - **Holding:** The Seventh Amendment affords a right to a jury trial on all issues pertinent to a § 504(c) statutory-damages award, including the amount; the statute itself does not provide that right, but the Constitution does - **Disposition:** Ninth Circuit reversed; case remanded ## The facts: broadcasts after a terminated license C. Elvin Feltner controlled Krypton International Corporation, which in 1990 acquired three television stations in the southeastern United States. Columbia Pictures Television had licensed several series to those stations, including *Who's the Boss*, *Silver Spoons*, *Hart to Hart*, and *T.J. Hooker*. After the stations fell behind on royalty payments, the parties attempted to restructure the debt; negotiations failed, and Columbia terminated the license agreements in October 1991. The stations kept broadcasting the programs anyway. Columbia sued for copyright infringement and elected statutory damages under § 504(c). The district court found the infringement willful and denied Feltner's request for a jury trial on statutory damages. Treating each broadcast of each episode on each station as a separate act of infringement, the court found 440 acts of infringement and awarded \$20,000 per act, for a total of \$8,800,000. The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether either the statute or the Seventh Amendment guaranteed Feltner a jury. ## Two questions: the statute, then the Constitution The Court approached the case in two steps. First, it asked whether § 504(c) itself confers a right to a jury determination of statutory damages. As the statute read at the time, the copyright owner could elect "to recover, instead of actual damages and profits, an award of statutory damages . . . in a sum of not less than \$500 or more than \$20,000 as the court considers just" (with a higher ceiling for willful infringement). Congress raised that range to \$750 and \$30,000 in 1999, after the decision. The Court read the phrase "as the court considers just," in context, to refer to the judge rather than the jury, and it found no other textual signal that Congress intended a jury to fix the amount. So the statute did not supply the right. That made the constitutional question unavoidable. Because the Court could not construe the statute to provide a jury right, it had to decide whether the Seventh Amendment compels one, a sequencing that itself illustrates the canon of avoiding constitutional questions only where a statute fairly permits. ## The Seventh Amendment analysis The Seventh Amendment preserves the right to a jury trial in "suits at common law." That phrase is understood to mean suits in which legal, as opposed to equitable, rights are at stake. The Court's established two-part inquiry asks whether the action is analogous to one tried at law in 18th-century England before the merger of law and equity, and, if so, whether the particular remedy sought is legal in nature. Justice Thomas surveyed the history and found that actions seeking damages for copyright infringement were tried in courts of law, before juries, both in England and in the early United States. There was a long tradition of juries assessing damages (including damages set within statutory ranges) in copyright and analogous infringement actions. On the remedy, the Court applied the general rule that monetary relief is legal, and observed that statutory damages "may serve purposes traditionally associated with legal relief, such as compensation and punishment." It rejected Columbia's argument that the remedy was equitable, holding that a monetary remedy is not rendered equitable simply because it is not fixed or readily calculable from a fixed formula. Because the remedy is legal, the Seventh Amendment attaches. The Court then took the decisive further step that gives the case its practical force. The jury right is not limited to the question of *liability*; it extends to the *amount* of statutory damages. Historically, the assessment of damages was a quintessential jury function, and the Court declined to carve the amount out of that tradition. If a defendant has a right to a jury on statutory damages at all, the jury must determine how much. Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment. He did not reach the Seventh Amendment question at all: invoking the doctrine of constitutional doubt, he read "court" in § 504(c) broadly enough to include the jury, tracing the phrase back to an 1856 copyright statute under which juries assessed damages. On that reading the statute itself supplied the right and the constitutional holding was unnecessary. ## Open questions *Feltner* settled that a jury must fix statutory damages when a party demands one, but it left the surrounding mechanics to later development. It did not specify the standards or instructions that should guide a jury exercising discretion across a wide statutory range, nor how appellate courts should review such awards for excessiveness. It did not address how the jury right interacts with the willfulness and innocent-infringement findings that move the statutory ceiling and floor, issues of who decides what that continue to recur. And because the right must be demanded, the decision left open how readily it can be waived and what a valid waiver requires. ## Implications - **For copyright defendants:** A defendant facing a statutory-damages claim may insist on a jury to set the amount, not merely to decide liability, a meaningful check on large judge-entered awards. - **For copyright owners:** Electing statutory damages no longer guarantees a bench determination of the sum; owners must be prepared to present the amount to a jury and to frame willfulness accordingly. - **For trial practice:** The decision makes the jury demand a critical early strategic choice and puts a premium on jury instructions that channel discretion within the statutory range. - **For remedies doctrine:** *Feltner* confirms that statutory damages are a legal substitute for actual damages and profits, situating them firmly on the "legal," jury-tried side of the law-equity divide. ## Frequently asked questions **Did Feltner win the case outright?** No. The Supreme Court reversed the \$8.8 million award and remanded for a jury trial on statutory damages. The ruling concerned the *process* for setting damages, not whether infringement occurred. **Does the jury decide only liability or also the dollar amount?** Both. The Court held the Seventh Amendment right extends to the amount of statutory damages, not just the existence of infringement. **Is the jury right automatic?** It must be invoked. The Seventh Amendment guarantees the right when a party demands a jury; a party that does not properly demand one may be tried to the bench. ## Authorities and sources - *Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc.*, 523 U.S. 340 (1998), No. 96-1768 (Mar. 31, 1998). Opinion and holding via [Cornell LII](https://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/96-1768.ZO.html) and the [full text at Cornell LII](https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/96-1768). - Case syllabus and reasoning: [Cornell LII syllabus](https://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/96-1768.ZS.html) and [Wikipedia summary](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Feltner_v._Columbia_Pictures_Television,_Inc.). - Statute: 17 U.S.C. § 504(c).