Octane Fitness v. ICON Health: Loosening the Standard for Attorney Fees in Patent Cases

A unanimous Supreme Court discarded the rigid Brooks Furniture test, holding that an 'exceptional' case under 35 U.S.C. § 285 is simply one that stands out from the norm.

A wooden judge's gavel resting beside stacks of paper currency on a desk
The case redefined when a district court may shift attorney fees to the losing party in patent litigation. Shutterstock
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Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 572 U.S. 545 (2014), reshaped the economics of patent litigation by making it easier for a prevailing party to recover its attorney fees. The Patent Act’s fee-shifting provision, 35 U.S.C. § 285, allows a court to award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party “in exceptional cases.” For a decade the Federal Circuit had read that spare language through the rigid lens of its 2005 Brooks Furniture decision, which permitted fees only when a case involved litigation-related misconduct or was both “objectively baseless” and “brought in subjective bad faith.” Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Sotomayor swept that framework aside, holding that “exceptional” means what it ordinarily means — a case that simply stands out from the others — and that the decision belongs to the district court’s case-by-case discretion.

At a glance

  • Case: Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 572 U.S. 545 (2014), Docket No. 12-1184
  • Court: Supreme Court of the United States, on certiorari to the Federal Circuit
  • Decided: April 29, 2014; unanimous (Justice Scalia joined the opinion except as to footnotes 1–3)
  • Opinion: Justice Sotomayor, for the Court
  • Subject matter: The standard governing an award of attorney fees to the prevailing party in a patent case under 35 U.S.C. § 285
  • Holding: An “exceptional” case is one that stands out from others with respect to the substantive strength of a party’s litigating position or the unreasonable manner in which it was litigated, to be determined by the district court in its discretion under a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard

The dispute and the Brooks Furniture framework

ICON Health & Fitness, a maker of exercise equipment, sued Octane Fitness for infringing a patent covering a mechanism for connecting the components of an elliptical machine. The district court granted summary judgment of non-infringement to Octane, and ICON did not appeal that ruling. Octane then moved for attorney fees under § 285, arguing that ICON’s infringement theory had been meritless. The district court denied the motion, and the Federal Circuit affirmed, both courts applying the exacting test the Federal Circuit had announced in Brooks Furniture Manufacturing, Inc. v. Dutailier International, Inc. (2005).

Under Brooks Furniture, a case could qualify as “exceptional” only in two circumstances: when there had been some material inappropriate conduct, such as litigation misconduct or inequitable conduct in prosecuting the patent; or when the litigation was both “brought in subjective bad faith” and “objectively baseless.” A party seeking fees had to establish these elements by clear and convincing evidence. The Federal Circuit had layered further rigidity onto the standard by treating objective baselessness and subjective bad faith as independent requirements, each of which had to be met. In practice, the framework made fee awards rare and difficult to obtain even against claims that had proven groundless.

A return to the ordinary meaning of “exceptional”

The Supreme Court found the Brooks Furniture standard “unduly rigid” and untethered from the statutory text. Section 285 imposes only one constraint on a district court’s discretion — the case must be “exceptional” — and the Court insisted that the word be given its ordinary meaning. Consulting contemporary dictionaries from the era when Congress adopted the fee provision, the Court explained that an “exceptional” case is simply one that is “uncommon,” “rare,” or “not ordinary.” From that starting point it distilled a functional standard: an exceptional case “is simply one that stands out from others with respect to the substantive strength of a party’s litigating position (considering both the governing law and the facts of the case) or the unreasonable manner in which the case was litigated.”

The Court underscored that no precise formula governs. District courts are to make the determination “case-by-case,” exercising “equitable discretion” and considering “the totality of the circumstances.” That approach, the Court noted, mirrored the flexible reading it had recently given to a similarly worded fee provision in the Copyright Act in Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc. The Brooks Furniture framework, by contrast, was “so demanding that it would appear to render § 285 largely superfluous,” because sanctionable conduct and independently actionable bad faith were already addressed by other tools such as the court’s inherent power and Rule 11.

Lowering the burden of proof

Beyond the substantive standard, the Court rejected the Federal Circuit’s requirement that a movant prove entitlement to fees by clear and convincing evidence. Nothing in § 285 justified a heightened burden; the provision “demands a simple discretionary inquiry” and “imposes no specific evidentiary burden, much less such a high one.” Patent-infringement litigation is ordinarily governed by a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard, and the Court saw no reason to depart from it when deciding whether a case is exceptional. The combined effect — a flexible discretionary standard applied under a preponderance burden — substantially lowered the barrier to recovering fees.

The Court decided a companion case the same day. In Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Management System, Inc., 572 U.S. 559 (2014), it held that because the exceptional-case determination is now committed to the district court’s discretion, an appellate court must review that determination for abuse of discretion rather than review the underlying legal questions de novo. Together, the two decisions relocated meaningful authority over fee-shifting from the Federal Circuit to the trial judges who had presided over the litigation and were best positioned to assess it.

Open questions

Octane Fitness deliberately traded predictability for flexibility, and the trade left important questions for later development. Because the standard turns on the “totality of the circumstances,” the decision offers little guidance on how much weakness in a litigating position, or how much unreasonableness in litigation conduct, is enough to make a case “stand out.” District courts have reached varying results on similar facts, and the abuse-of-discretion review prescribed by Highmark means the Federal Circuit rarely disturbs them, producing a body of law that is fact-bound rather than rule-bound. The decision also left open how § 285 interacts with the broader problem of abusive patent assertion: while the looser standard is a tool against weak suits, it applies symmetrically and can expose accused infringers who litigate unreasonably to fee awards as well.

Implications

  • Fees are easier to obtain — for either side. A prevailing plaintiff or defendant can recover fees whenever the case stands out for the weakness of the opponent’s position or the unreasonableness of its conduct; the provision is not a one-way street favoring accused infringers.
  • District court discretion is now decisive. Because the trial court’s determination is reviewed only for abuse of discretion, the fee decision is effectively made — and usually settled — at the district court level.
  • The burden of proof is preponderance. Movants no longer must marshal clear and convincing evidence, materially improving the odds of a successful fee motion.
  • Litigation conduct carries real cost. Unreasonable positions, shifting infringement theories, and vexatious tactics can independently render a case exceptional even where the underlying claim was not objectively baseless.

Frequently asked questions

What makes a patent case “exceptional” under 35 U.S.C. § 285? After Octane Fitness, an exceptional case is simply one that stands out from others with respect to the substantive strength of a party’s litigating position or the unreasonable manner in which the case was litigated. District courts decide the question case-by-case in the exercise of their discretion, considering the totality of the circumstances.

What standard of proof applies to a fee request under § 285? A preponderance of the evidence. The Court rejected the prior requirement that entitlement to fees be proven by clear and convincing evidence, noting that Section 285 imposes no such heightened burden.

How did Octane Fitness change patent litigation? By replacing the rigid, dual-prong Brooks Furniture framework with a flexible discretionary standard and a lower burden of proof, the decision made it meaningfully easier for prevailing parties to recover fees, giving courts a stronger tool against weak or abusively litigated patent claims.

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Lidiia Levitska
About the Author

Lidiia Levitska

International Intellectual Property Attorney

Lidiia Levitska focuses on intellectual property dispute resolution, policy, and advisory work across international institutions and government bodies. From 2021 to 2025 she served at the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), managing arbitration cases and overseeing compliance with the Uniform Domain-Name Dispute-Resolution Policy (UDRP), and earlier led IP policy research as a Senior Policy Officer at the American Chamber of Commerce in Ukraine. She holds an LL.M. in International Intellectual Property Law from Chicago-Kent College of Law and an M.A. in Information Technology Law from the University of Tartu, and was admitted to the Ukrainian Bar in 2019.

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