POM Wonderful v. Coca-Cola

The Supreme Court held that the federal food-labeling statute does not preclude competitors from bringing Lanham Act false-advertising suits over food and beverage labels.

A bottle of juice that was 99.4% apple and grape but sold as “Pomegranate Blueberry” gave the Supreme Court a chance to sort out how two great federal regulatory regimes coexist. In POM Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co., 573 U.S. 102 (2014), decided June 12, 2014, the Court held unanimously that the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act does not preclude a competitor from bringing a false-advertising claim under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a), challenging a food or beverage label — even a label that the Food and Drug Administration also regulates. Justice Kennedy wrote for the Court; Justice Breyer took no part. The ruling reframed the relationship between trademark-style unfair-competition law and federal food regulation.

At a glance

Case: POM Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co., No. 12-761, 573 U.S. 102 (U.S. June 12, 2014).
Court: Supreme Court of the United States; opinion by Justice Kennedy for a unanimous Court (Justice Breyer not participating).
Posture: Reversing the Ninth Circuit, which had affirmed partial summary judgment that the FDCA precluded POM’s Lanham Act label challenge.
Holding: The FDCA and its regulations do not preclude a private Lanham Act false-advertising claim challenging the name and label of a food or beverage product.
Significance: Established that the two federal statutes complement rather than displace each other, leaving competitors free to police misleading food labels through Lanham Act litigation.

POM Wonderful makes a pomegranate-blueberry juice blend. Coca-Cola, through its Minute Maid brand, sold a product whose label prominently featured the words “Pomegranate Blueberry,” with the rest of the name in smaller type, despite the blend being overwhelmingly apple and grape juice with only trace amounts of pomegranate and blueberry. POM sued under the Lanham Act, alleging the name and label misled consumers. The district court granted Coca-Cola partial summary judgment, holding that the FDCA and FDA labeling regulations precluded the Lanham Act challenge to the name and label, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed.

Preclusion, not preemption

The Court began by clarifying the question. This was not a preemption case, which concerns whether federal law displaces state law. Both the Lanham Act and the FDCA are federal statutes, so the issue was preclusion — whether one federal statute bars a cause of action under another. That framing matters, Justice Kennedy explained, because the usual preemption presumptions do not apply; instead the analysis turns on the texts, structures, and purposes of the two congressional enactments.

Neither statute, the Court found, expressly forbids or limits Lanham Act claims that challenge labels regulated by the FDCA. Congress knew how to bar private suits when it wanted to, and it did not do so here. The FDCA forecloses certain private enforcement of its own provisions, but that limitation says nothing about claims arising under a separate statute like the Lanham Act. Absence of a textual bar weighed heavily toward allowing the suit.

Complementary statutes serving different ends

The heart of the opinion is its account of how the two laws fit together. The Lanham Act and the FDCA, the Court explained, “complement each other” in important respects. Both touch on food and beverage labeling, but they pursue different goals through different means. The Lanham Act protects commercial interests against unfair competition, relying on suits by market participants who have detailed knowledge of how marketing affects sales. The FDCA protects public health and safety, enforced by a federal agency through its own regulatory tools.

Allowing Lanham Act suits, the Court reasoned, actually advances the overall scheme. Competitors who litigate false-advertising claims supplement the FDA’s efforts; the agency cannot police every label, and it does not necessarily have the same incentives or information as an injured rival. Justice Kennedy rejected the argument that FDA regulation set a ceiling on permissible labeling claims. The FDCA establishes a floor of mandatory disclosures and prohibitions, not an exhaustive code that immunizes any label the agency has not specifically forbidden. A label can satisfy FDA requirements and still mislead consumers in ways the Lanham Act reaches.

The limits and the aftermath

The decision is narrow in an important sense: it resolves only whether the claim may be brought, not whether Coca-Cola’s label was in fact deceptive. The Court reversed the preclusion ruling and sent the case back for litigation on the merits. It did not hold that the Minute Maid label was false or misleading, nor did it disturb the FDA’s authority to set and enforce its own labeling rules.

What happened next underscores that distinction. On remand, the case proceeded to trial, and in 2016 a California federal jury found for Coca-Cola on the false-advertising merits — concluding POM had not proven the label deceived consumers or caused it injury. So while POM “won” at the Supreme Court by clearing the path to sue, it ultimately lost the underlying dispute. The lasting significance of the case lies not in who prevailed on the label, but in the doctrine that food and beverage marketers cannot use FDA compliance as a shield against competitor false-advertising suits.

Open questions

Where is the line between complement and conflict? The Court left for future cases situations where an FDA regulation directly authorizes the very label language a Lanham Act plaintiff attacks.
How does this apply to drugs and cosmetics? POM concerned food and beverages; the precise reach of its reasoning to other FDCA-regulated products is less settled.
What about consumer (not competitor) claims? The decision addressed a competitor’s Lanham Act suit, leaving state consumer-protection interactions with the FDCA to other doctrines.

Implications

FDA compliance is a floor, not a shield. Meeting FDA labeling rules does not immunize a product from a competitor’s Lanham Act false-advertising claim.
Preclusion analysis turns on text and purpose. Between two federal statutes, courts look to whether Congress barred the second cause of action, not to preemption presumptions.
Competitor enforcement supplements the agency. The Court endorsed private Lanham Act suits as a complement to limited FDA enforcement resources.
Winning the right to sue is not winning the case. POM’s later jury loss shows that clearing preclusion only opens the door to proving actual deception and injury.
Label carefully even when “technically” compliant. Marketers should assess whether a label could mislead consumers, not just whether it satisfies FDA minimums.

Frequently asked questions

What did POM Wonderful v. Coca-Cola decide? The Supreme Court held unanimously that the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act does not preclude a competitor’s Lanham Act false-advertising claim challenging a food or beverage label, even where the label is regulated by the FDA. Competitors may sue under the Lanham Act over misleading labels.

Is this a preemption case? No. The Court framed the issue as preclusion between two federal statutes, not preemption of state law. Because both the Lanham Act and the FDCA are federal, the question was whether one federal statute bars a private suit under the other, and the Court held it does not.

Did POM ultimately win against Coca-Cola? No. POM won the Supreme Court ruling that its suit could proceed, but on remand a California federal jury ultimately found for Coca-Cola in 2016 on the false-advertising merits. The Supreme Court decision was about whether the claim could be brought, not whether the label was actually deceptive.