Tennessee v. NCAA — Right of Publicity

A federal court blocked the NCAA from enforcing its ban on name-image-likeness deals during recruiting, finding the rule a likely antitrust violation that suppressed athletes' compensation.

For years the NCAA insisted that athletes could profit from their name, image, and likeness only within tight limits—and never as an inducement to pick a school. That position cracked in early 2024. In Tennessee v. NCAA, No. 3:24-cv-00033, 718 F. Supp. 3d 756 (E.D. Tenn. 2024), the attorneys general of Tennessee and Virginia sued the NCAA, and Judge Clifton L. Corker granted a preliminary injunction barring the association from enforcing its NIL-recruiting restrictions. The court found the states likely to prevail on their claim that the ban was an unreasonable restraint of trade under the Sherman Act—in effect, price-fixing in the market for college athletes’ publicity rights. The decision accelerated the collapse of the NCAA’s amateurism guardrails and reframed NIL as an antitrust battleground.

At a glance

Case: State of Tennessee & Commonwealth of Virginia v. National Collegiate Athletic Association, No. 3:24-cv-00033, 718 F. Supp. 3d 756 (E.D. Tenn. 2024).
Court: U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee; opinion by Judge Clifton L. Corker.
Posture: Motion for a preliminary injunction in a civil antitrust action brought by two state attorneys general; injunction granted Feb. 23, 2024 (an earlier request for a temporary restraining order was denied).
Holding: The states showed a likelihood of success on the merits that the NCAA’s NIL-recruiting ban is an unreasonable restraint of trade under Section 1 of the Sherman Act; the NCAA was enjoined from enforcing it pending final judgment.
Significance: Opened the door for recruits and transfers to negotiate NIL compensation with collectives and boosters before committing to a school, hastening the deregulation of college sports.

How the dispute arose

After the Supreme Court’s 2021 decision in NCAA v. Alston and the association’s hurried adoption of an Interim NIL Policy, athletes could earn money from endorsements, autographs, and the like. But the NCAA maintained that NIL deals could not be used to recruit—that compensation could not be discussed or promised to a prospect before enrollment, and that “collectives” of boosters could not negotiate with recruits to lure them to a program. When the NCAA opened enforcement inquiries, including matters touching the University of Tennessee, the states moved.

On January 31, 2024, Tennessee and Virginia filed suit in the Eastern District of Tennessee, alleging that the NCAA’s enforcement of its NIL-recruiting rules violated federal antitrust law. They sought emergency relief. The court declined to issue a temporary restraining order but, after briefing, granted a preliminary injunction in late February, finding the standard for that broader relief satisfied.

The antitrust theory: a restraint on the NIL market

The legal heart of the ruling is Section 1 of the Sherman Act, which forbids contracts, combinations, or conspiracies in restraint of trade. The NCAA is an association of competing schools; its rules are agreements among horizontal competitors. The states argued—and the court agreed was likely correct—that barring collectives from negotiating NIL compensation with recruits until after they commit to a school is an unreasonable restraint on the market for athletes’ NIL rights.

Judge Corker characterized the recruiting ban as a form of price-fixing. By prohibiting collectives of competing colleges from discussing “prices” with recruits until after the athlete has already selected a school, the rule strips prospects of the leverage and information they need to discover their true market value. An athlete cannot meaningfully compare offers when the most consequential NIL terms cannot be negotiated until the decisive choice has already been made. The court found this both suppressed athletes’ earning potential and distorted the NIL market in a way that harmed competition—classic antitrust injury.

Applying the injunction standard

A preliminary injunction requires more than a likely-winning claim. The court worked through the familiar factors: likelihood of success on the merits, irreparable harm, the balance of equities, and the public interest. On the merits, the antitrust theory carried the day. On irreparable harm, the court reasoned that recruits forced to make enrollment decisions without knowing their NIL value suffer harm that money damages cannot fully repair, because the recruiting cycle and the choice of school are time-sensitive and effectively unrepeatable.

The balance of equities and the public interest also favored the states; the court was unpersuaded that enjoining the ban would meaningfully disrupt the NCAA beyond requiring it to stop enforcing a rule of doubtful legality. The court therefore restrained and enjoined the NCAA from enforcing the Interim NIL Policy, its bylaws, or any other authority to the extent they prohibit student-athletes from negotiating NIL compensation with third parties—including boosters and collectives—until a final decision on the merits.

Open questions

Will the merits match the preliminary finding? A likelihood-of-success ruling is not a final judgment; the antitrust claim still had to be proven (or settled) on a full record.
Where is the line between NIL and pay-for-play? The injunction protects NIL negotiation, but in practice collectives often function as recruiting inducements, blurring the boundary the NCAA long policed.
What national rule emerges? With multiple suits, settlements, and proposed federal legislation in motion, whether a uniform framework or continued state-by-state litigation governs college athlete compensation remains unsettled.

Implications

For athletes and recruits: They can negotiate NIL compensation with collectives and boosters before choosing a school, gaining leverage and price transparency the old rules denied.
For the NCAA: Its enforcement authority over NIL recruiting is sharply curtailed, and the antitrust framing of Alston now extends well beyond education-related benefits.
For schools and collectives: The competitive environment is more open but legally fluid; compliance strategies must track fast-moving litigation and any eventual settlement or legislation.
For publicity-rights practice: The case shows how athletes’ name, image, and likeness—long a publicity concept—are increasingly governed by antitrust principles when collective rules suppress their market value.

Frequently asked questions

What did the court actually decide? It granted a preliminary injunction barring the NCAA from enforcing its NIL-recruiting rules while the case proceeds. The court found the states likely to succeed on their Sherman Act claim that the rules unlawfully restrained the market for athletes’ name, image, and likeness rights.

Does this mean recruits can be paid to play? Not exactly. The ruling lets recruits and athletes negotiate NIL compensation with collectives and boosters before committing to a school, rather than after. It addresses NIL deals tied to publicity rights, not direct pay-for-play salaries, though the line has blurred in practice.

Why was this framed as an antitrust case rather than a publicity case? Because the plaintiffs were state attorneys general challenging the NCAA’s rules as an agreement among competing schools that suppressed compensation. The court analyzed the recruiting ban as a horizontal restraint—effectively price-fixing—in the market for athletes’ NIL rights under the Sherman Act.