Trade Secrets: Frequently Asked Questions

398 common questions about trade secrets law, answered in plain English. Each answer links to the full guide or case analysis it comes from. Browse the Trade Secrets case-law archive for the underlying decisions. Educational only, not legal advice.

Are non-compete agreements enforceable in California?: Generally no. California Business and Professions Code Section 16600 voids most non-compete agreements in the employment context, no matter how narrowly they are drafted. Only a few statutory exceptions apply, mainly when someone sells a business or dissolves a partnership or LLC. For your specific situation, talk to an attorney licensed in your jurisdiction. Read more: Are Non-Competes Enforceable in California? (2026) ›
What if I signed a non-compete in another state before moving to California?: Under SB 699, which added Section 16600.5 effective January 1, 2024, a non-compete that would be void under California law is unenforceable in California even if it was signed in another state where such agreements are allowed. The law also gives employees a private right of action and the ability to recover attorney's fees, but you should confirm how it applies to your facts with a licensed attorney. Read more: Are Non-Competes Enforceable in California? (2026) ›
Can my employer still protect its trade secrets without a non-compete?: Yes. California's ban on non-competes does not eliminate trade secret protection. Employers can still use confidentiality agreements and NDAs and can pursue claims for trade secret misappropriation under state and federal law. What they generally cannot do is stop you from working for a competitor simply to prevent ordinary competition. Read more: Are Non-Competes Enforceable in California? (2026) ›
What is the Defend Trade Secrets Act?: The DTSA is the 2016 federal law, codified principally at 18 U.S.C. § 1836, that created a private civil cause of action for trade secret misappropriation in federal court. Before it, civil trade secret law was almost entirely state UTSA law. The DTSA covers any trade secret related to a product or service used in, or intended for use in, interstate or foreign commerce, which nearly every business secret satisfies. It offers injunctions, damages for actual loss and unjust enrichment or a reasonable royalty, exemplary damages up to twice the award for willful and malicious misappropriation, attorney fees, and a rarely used ex parte seizure procedure. It does not preempt state law, so plaintiffs typically plead both. Read more: The Defend Trade Secrets Act (DTSA), Explained ›
What is the DTSA whistleblower immunity notice, and what happens if my contracts omit it?: Section 1833(b) grants individuals immunity from trade secret liability for disclosing a trade secret in confidence to government officials or an attorney solely to report or investigate a suspected violation of law, or in a sealed court filing. Employers must provide notice of this immunity in any contract with an employee, contractor, or consultant that governs trade secrets or confidential information, entered into or updated after May 11, 2016; a cross-reference to a policy document works. The penalty: in a DTSA action against a worker who never got the notice, the employer may not recover exemplary damages or attorney fees. Since those are often the remedies that make employee cases worth bringing, the missing paragraph is expensive. Read more: The Defend Trade Secrets Act (DTSA), Explained ›
How is a DTSA claim different from a state UTSA claim?: Substantively they are close cousins: the DTSA's definitions of trade secret, misappropriation, and improper means were modeled on the UTSA, and both carry three-year limitations periods and similar remedies. The practical differences: the DTSA guarantees a federal forum with nationwide service and federal discovery for any secret touching interstate commerce; it adds the ex parte seizure remedy no state statute has; it forbids injunctions that prevent a person from entering an employment relationship, requiring evidence of threatened misappropriation rather than merely what the person knows; and it includes the whistleblower immunity and notice scheme. The DTSA does not preempt state law, so most complaints plead DTSA plus the state claim, though California's CUTSA adds preemption quirks. Read more: The Defend Trade Secrets Act (DTSA), Explained ›
What is an ex parte seizure under the DTSA?: Section 1836(b)(2) lets a court, in extraordinary circumstances, order federal law enforcement to seize property necessary to prevent the propagation or dissemination of a stolen trade secret, without notice to the target. The applicant must show: that ordinary injunctive relief would be inadequate because the target would evade it, that immediate and irreparable injury will otherwise occur, that the balance of harms favors seizure, likely success on the merits, that the target actually possesses the secret and the property, a particular description of what is to be seized, and that the target would destroy, move, or hide the material if given notice. Courts grant these sparingly, wrongful seizure carries damages liability, and most cases proceed instead by temporary restraining order. Read more: The Defend Trade Secrets Act (DTSA), Explained ›
What is an IP assignment gap?: An IP assignment gap is a break in a company's chain of title: someone who created code, designs, or inventions the company relies on never signed a written assignment transferring ownership to the company. Under U.S. default rules, independent contractors own what they create, and patent rights vest in the individual inventor, so without a signed assignment the company only has an implied license (or nothing) rather than clean ownership. Gaps are the number-one problem investors and acquirers flag in diligence. Read more: IP Assignment Gaps That Kill Deals ›
Do independent contractors own the code they write for you?: Yes, by default. Unless a contractor signs a written agreement assigning IP to your company, the contractor owns the copyright in the code, logos, or content they create. The 'work made for hire' rule almost never applies to independent contractors, because their work rarely fits the nine statutory categories in 17 U.S.C. § 101. Paying an invoice does not transfer ownership. You need a present-tense written assignment ('hereby assigns') signed by the contractor. Read more: IP Assignment Gaps That Kill Deals ›
How do you fix a missing IP assignment?: Get a confirmatory assignment: a written agreement in which the creator confirms they assigned, and hereby assign, all IP to the company, ideally retroactive to the original engagement. For founders, use a technology or IP transfer agreement at incorporation. For patents, record the assignment with the USPTO. Fix gaps before diligence starts. Remediating during a live deal is slower, costlier, and gives the other side leverage on price and terms. Read more: IP Assignment Gaps That Kill Deals ›
Does a work-made-for-hire clause transfer all IP?: No. Work made for hire only covers copyright, and for contractors only if the work fits one of nine narrow statutory categories and both parties sign an agreement saying so. It does nothing for patents, which must be assigned by the inventor regardless of employment. That is why well-drafted agreements pair a work-made-for-hire clause with a present-tense assignment of all IP as a backstop. The assignment does the real work. Read more: IP Assignment Gaps That Kill Deals ›
What is an IP audit before a funding round?: A pre-raise IP audit is a systematic review of every intellectual property asset your company owns or uses (patents, trademarks, copyrights, trade secrets, domains, and software), plus the paperwork proving you actually own it. The goal is to inventory each asset, confirm clean chain of title through assignment agreements, catch open-source and licensing risks, and assemble the IP section of your data room before investors run their own diligence and find the gaps first. Read more: The IP Audit Before You Raise Capital ›
How long does an IP audit take before raising capital?: For an early-stage startup with a focused product, a founder-led IP audit typically takes one to three weeks of part-time work: a few days to build the inventory, a week to chase down missing assignment signatures and license terms, and a few days to organize the data room. If you have years of contractor work, acquisitions, or open-source dependencies to untangle, budget four to six weeks and involve counsel early. Read more: The IP Audit Before You Raise Capital ›
What IP problems kill or delay a funding round?: The classic deal-killers are missing IP assignments (a founder, employee, or contractor who never signed over their work), copyleft open-source code baked into a proprietary product, unclear ownership of AI-generated output, expired or unrenewed trademarks, and liens or prior grants that encumber the IP. Any one can trigger a lower valuation, a holdback in escrow, or a signed representation you cannot honestly make. Read more: The IP Audit Before You Raise Capital ›
Do I need a lawyer to run a pre-raise IP audit?: You can build the inventory and gather documents yourself, and doing so first saves legal fees. But have an IP attorney review chain of title, open-source exposure, and any licenses-in and licenses-out before you sign a term sheet. The IP representations and warranties in a financing agreement are legally binding, and a lawyer helps you fix gaps quietly now rather than during a live investor diligence scramble. Read more: The IP Audit Before You Raise Capital ›
What do investors look for in IP due diligence?: Investors want a clean chain of title (proof the company, not a founder or contractor, owns every core asset) plus registered IP where it matters, no infringement exposure, and no encumbrances like liens or exclusive licenses. They review invention-assignment agreements, open-source usage, key employee agreements, and any IP-related litigation or demand letters. Gaps here don't just lower valuation; they can pause a wire until you fix them. Read more: IP Diligence for Fundraising & M&A ›
What is a chain-of-title problem in an acquisition?: A chain-of-title problem means the company can't prove it owns an asset outright because a link in the transfer is missing or defective: a founder who never assigned code, a contractor who kept copyright, or a patent assignment that was never recorded. Buyers treat these as deal-blockers because they can't buy what the seller doesn't clearly own. Most are fixable with confirmatory assignments before closing, but only if you find them early. Read more: IP Diligence for Fundraising & M&A ›
Can open-source software kill a startup acquisition?: It can complicate or reduce one. The main risk is copyleft licenses like GPL and AGPL, which can require you to release proprietary source code you combined with the licensed component. Acquirers run software composition analysis to inventory every dependency and its license. Permissive licenses (MIT, Apache 2.0, BSD) are usually fine with attribution. The danger is unknown copyleft code buried deep in the codebase that surfaces during diligence. Read more: IP Diligence for Fundraising & M&A ›
What IP reps and warranties do founders sign in a deal?: In a stock or asset purchase agreement, founders and the company typically represent that they own or have licensed all IP used in the business, that it doesn't infringe third-party rights, that there are no liens or claims, and that all employees and contractors assigned their work. These reps are usually backed by indemnification, an escrow holdback, and a survival period. A false rep can mean losing part of the purchase price or personal liability. Read more: IP Diligence for Fundraising & M&A ›
What is an acquihire, and does IP still matter?: An acquihire is an acquisition made primarily to hire a team rather than to buy a product, revenue, or customer base. IP still matters enormously. The team's code, models, designs, and know-how usually transfer with them, and the buyer needs clean title to whatever the target built. If assignment paperwork is missing or a founder retained rights, the buyer can end up hiring people who don't actually own the work they created. Read more: IP in Acquihires: What Buyers and Founders Must Watch ›
Does the buyer own the code the team built before the acquihire?: Only if the target company properly owns it first, then assigns it. That requires signed invention-assignment agreements from every employee, founder, and contractor, plus a clean chain of title into the target. Gaps are common: a co-founder who never signed, a freelancer who built the original prototype, or open-source code with copyleft terms. The buyer should verify each link before closing, not assume the team's work automatically transfers. Read more: IP in Acquihires: What Buyers and Founders Must Watch ›
Can prior-invention carve-outs let an employee keep IP the buyer wants?: Yes. Most invention-assignment agreements let an employee exclude 'prior inventions' they created before joining. If a founder listed the core technology on their Schedule A carve-out, they may personally own it, not the company. In an acquihire the buyer should review every carve-out schedule, confirm nothing critical was excluded, and get a separate assignment from any individual who holds rights the deal depends on. Read more: IP in Acquihires: What Buyers and Founders Must Watch ›
Should an acquihire be structured as an asset deal or a stock deal?: It depends. Asset deals let the buyer cherry-pick the IP and leave behind liabilities, but require assigning each asset and can trigger consent or anti-assignment issues in licenses. Stock (or merger) deals transfer everything automatically, including hidden liabilities, but avoid re-assigning IP one item at a time. Many acquihires are structured as asset purchases or reverse triangular mergers; tax, liability, and IP-transfer mechanics drive the choice. Read more: IP in Acquihires: What Buyers and Founders Must Watch ›
What are IP representations and warranties?: IP reps and warranties are factual promises a company and its founders make in a financing or acquisition agreement about the state of the company's intellectual property. Typical reps cover ownership and clear title, non-infringement of others' rights, validity of registered IP, absence of pending or threatened claims, sufficiency of the IP to run the business, and open-source compliance. If a rep turns out to be false, the buyer or investor can seek indemnification for the resulting losses. Read more: IP Reps and Warranties, Explained ›
What is a knowledge qualifier in an IP rep?: A knowledge qualifier limits a representation to what the company actually knows, converting an absolute promise ("the company does not infringe") into a softer one ("to the company's knowledge, the company does not infringe"). It shifts risk to the buyer for unknown problems. Negotiate carefully who counts as a "knowledge party" and whether knowledge means actual awareness or includes a duty of reasonable inquiry, which is a much broader standard. Read more: IP Reps and Warranties, Explained ›
How do disclosure schedules protect founders?: Disclosure schedules are attachments where you list exceptions to the reps: every license, encumbrance, pending dispute, or open-source dependency. Anything properly disclosed generally cannot be the basis of an indemnification claim, because the buyer knew about it. Complete, accurate schedules are a founder's single best defense: they convert potential surprises into known, priced risks. Sloppy or thin schedules are one of the most common causes of post-closing indemnity fights. Read more: IP Reps and Warranties, Explained ›
What is representation and warranty insurance?: Rep and warranty (R&W) insurance is a policy, common in M&A deals above roughly $20-30 million, that covers losses from breaches of the seller's reps, including IP reps. A buyer-side policy lets the buyer recover from an insurer instead of clawing back money from founders, often allowing a smaller escrow or holdback. Premiums typically run 2-4% of the coverage limit, with a retention (deductible) the parties negotiate over. Read more: IP Reps and Warranties, Explained ›
Do I need an NDA before pitching my invention?: It depends on who you are pitching. A vendor, manufacturer, or potential co-developer will often sign an NDA, and you should ask for one. Professional investors and large companies frequently refuse to sign NDAs at the pitch stage, so you cannot rely on an NDA alone. The more durable protection is filing a patent application, even a provisional, before you disclose, because that locks in your filing date regardless of whether anyone signs. This is general information, not legal advice. Read more: Do You Need an NDA Before Pitching Your Invention? ›
What happens if I pitch my invention without any protection?: In the United States there is a one-year grace period that can let you still file a patent after your own public disclosure, but it is a safety net, not a plan, and it does not apply everywhere. Most foreign countries follow absolute novelty, meaning a public disclosure before filing can permanently bar a patent there. A public, non-confidential pitch can therefore destroy your foreign patent rights and start the US clock running. An attorney licensed in your jurisdiction can assess your specific exposure. Read more: Do You Need an NDA Before Pitching Your Invention? ›
Will a provisional patent application protect me if I cannot get an NDA?: A provisional application establishes an early filing date and gives you up to twelve months to file a full non-provisional application. Because the United States uses a first-inventor-to-file system, that early date is valuable, and it preserves your foreign filing options if you file before disclosing. It only protects what it actually describes, so it should be thorough. Filing a provisional before pitching is the most reliable move when an NDA is off the table. Read more: Do You Need an NDA Before Pitching Your Invention? ›
What makes an NDA enforceable?: A defensible NDA has a clear, specific definition of confidential information, a reasonable scope tied to a legitimate business interest, standard carve-outs for public or independently developed information, and a sensible duration. Courts look skeptically at vague, catch-all definitions that sweep in everything a person learns. The narrower and more specific the protected information, the more likely a court will enforce the agreement. This is general information, not legal advice. Read more: NDAs That Actually Hold Up ›
Is a mutual or a one-way NDA better?: Neither is inherently better; they fit different situations. A one-way (unilateral) NDA protects only the disclosing party and is common when one side shares secrets, such as an employer, a client, or a founder showing technical details. A mutual NDA protects both parties and fits partnerships, joint ventures, and merger talks where both sides exchange sensitive information. Choose the structure that matches who is actually disclosing. Read more: NDAs That Actually Hold Up ›
Will investors sign an NDA?: Usually not at the pitch stage. Professional investors see many similar pitches, and signing an NDA for each would create legal conflicts and slow them down. Most decline as a matter of policy, not because they intend to steal an idea. Founders generally protect themselves by sharing the vision while holding back the deepest technical secrets until later stages. An attorney licensed in your jurisdiction can advise on your specific situation. Read more: NDAs That Actually Hold Up ›
Are NDAs enforceable in California?: Generally yes. A confidentiality agreement or NDA that protects genuine trade secrets and confidential information is enforceable in California. The catch is scope: if an NDA is written so broadly that it effectively stops a former employee from working in their field or for a competitor, courts can treat it as a disguised non-compete and refuse to enforce that part. The key is protecting actual secrets, not restraining competition. Read more: NDA vs. Non-Compete in California: What's Actually Enforceable ›
Are non-competes enforceable in California?: Almost never in the employment context. California Business and Professions Code section 16600 voids contracts that restrain someone from engaging in a lawful profession, trade, or business, and courts read it broadly to void employee non-competes no matter how narrowly tailored, unless a narrow statutory exception applies. Section 16600.5 also makes such contracts unenforceable regardless of where they were signed. Read more: NDA vs. Non-Compete in California: What's Actually Enforceable ›
Can a confidentiality clause be struck down as a hidden non-compete?: Yes. California courts have invalidated overbroad confidentiality and non-solicitation clauses when they function as de facto non-competes. If a clause is so sweeping that it prevents a former employee from practicing their trade at all, a court can strike it down even though it is labeled 'confidentiality' rather than 'non-compete.' This is general information, not legal advice. Read more: NDA vs. Non-Compete in California: What's Actually Enforceable ›
Did the FTC ban non-competes in 2026?: No. The FTC voted in April 2024 to ban most non-competes nationwide, but a federal judge in the Northern District of Texas set the rule aside in Ryan LLC v. FTC in August 2024, before it could take effect. As of 2026 the rule is not in force anywhere in the country. Whether a non-compete is enforceable is still decided entirely by state law, which varies dramatically. Read more: Non-Competes and Trade Secrets in 2026 ›
Which states ban non-competes in 2026?: Four states void nearly all employee non-competes: California (Business & Professions Code § 16600), North Dakota, Oklahoma, and Minnesota (for agreements signed on or after July 1, 2023). Many other states (including Washington, Illinois, Colorado, and Oregon) enforce them only above income thresholds or under strict conditions. Most remaining states enforce a non-compete if it is reasonable in scope, duration, and geography. Read more: Non-Competes and Trade Secrets in 2026 ›
Can you protect trade secrets without a non-compete?: Yes, and it is often the better approach. Trade secret law under the federal Defend Trade Secrets Act and state Uniform Trade Secrets Act protects your confidential information no matter what an employee's contract says. That includes California, which bans non-competes. Pair that statutory protection with NDAs, non-solicitation clauses, invention-assignment agreements, access controls, and exit protocols, and you get durable protection that holds up in every state. Read more: Non-Competes and Trade Secrets in 2026 ›
What is the difference between a non-compete and an NDA?: A non-compete bars someone from working for a competitor or starting a competing business for a set time and area: it restricts where they can work. An NDA (non-disclosure agreement) only bars them from using or revealing your confidential information: it restricts what they can share, not where they go. NDAs are far more widely enforceable, and California expressly permits them even though it voids most non-competes. Read more: Non-Competes and Trade Secrets in 2026 ›
What is the main difference between a patent and a trade secret?: A patent requires you to publicly disclose your invention in exchange for a time-limited legal monopoly, typically about 20 years from the filing date for a utility patent. A trade secret requires the opposite: you keep the information confidential, and protection lasts indefinitely, but only for as long as it stays secret and has value from being secret. Read more: Patent vs. Trade Secret: Which Protects Your Invention? ›
Can I keep an invention secret and patent it later?: Often no. U.S. law has an 'on-sale bar' and rules against your own prior public use or sale, so selling or publicly using an invention for too long before filing can permanently destroy your right to patent it. If keeping it secret is part of your plan, you usually have to commit to that path early. Talk to a patent attorney licensed in your jurisdiction before you sell or disclose anything. Read more: Patent vs. Trade Secret: Which Protects Your Invention? ›
Does a trade secret stop a competitor from reverse engineering my product?: No. Trade secret law only protects against improper acquisition, like theft or breaking a confidentiality agreement. A competitor who lawfully buys your product and figures out how it works through reverse engineering, or who independently invents the same thing, has done nothing wrong, and your trade secret protection over that information ends. Read more: Patent vs. Trade Secret: Which Protects Your Invention? ›
What law protects trade secrets in California?: California's main trade secret law is the California Uniform Trade Secrets Act (CUTSA), found at Civil Code section 3426 and following. It defines what counts as a trade secret, what counts as misappropriation, and the remedies a court can award, including injunctions, damages, exemplary damages up to twice the award for willful and malicious misappropriation, and attorney's fees in certain cases. A federal law, the Defend Trade Secrets Act (DTSA), is also available and can let you sue in federal court. Read more: How to Protect a Trade Secret in California (CUTSA Basics) ›
Do I have to register a trade secret in California?: No. Unlike a patent or a federal trademark, there is no application, filing, or registration for a trade secret. Protection arises automatically when commercially valuable information is kept secret and you take reasonable measures to maintain that secrecy. The flip side is that there is no certificate to rely on, so if you fail to take reasonable steps to protect the information, it may not qualify as a trade secret at all. Read more: How to Protect a Trade Secret in California (CUTSA Basics) ›
Why are trade secrets so important for California businesses?: Because California generally voids non-compete agreements under Business and Professions Code section 16600, employers usually cannot stop a departing employee from working for a competitor. That makes trade secret protection one of the main legal tools California businesses have to guard confidential information when employees leave. Strong confidentiality practices, not non-competes, do the heavy lifting here. Read more: How to Protect a Trade Secret in California (CUTSA Basics) ›
How do I stop a departing employee from taking trade secrets?: You can't rely on trust. You rely on process. Before they leave, run an exit interview reminding them of their confidentiality and invention-assignment obligations, recover every company device and credential, disable all system access immediately, and preserve their access and download logs. Have them sign a termination certification confirming they've returned all confidential materials. The combination of signed agreements plus a documented departure protocol is what lets you act fast (and prove misappropriation) if secrets later surface at a competitor. Read more: Protecting Trade Secrets When Employees Leave ›
What is the inevitable disclosure doctrine?: Inevitable disclosure lets an employer stop a former employee from taking a new job when they would 'inevitably' rely on the employer's trade secrets to do it, even without proof they actually took anything. It comes from the 1995 Seventh Circuit case PepsiCo v. Redmond. Some states, including Illinois, accept it; others limit it; and California rejects it outright because it functions like a backdoor non-compete. Whether it's available depends entirely on your state's law. Read more: Protecting Trade Secrets When Employees Leave ›
Can an employee use skills and knowledge from a previous job?: Generally yes. Trade secret law protects specific, secret information (formulas, source code, customer lists, pricing), not the general skills, experience, and know-how an employee carries in their head. Courts consistently refuse to let employers lock in workers by calling ordinary expertise a 'secret.' The line is fuzzy and heavily litigated, which is exactly why identifying and marking your actual secrets, and using narrowly drafted agreements, matters so much. Read more: Protecting Trade Secrets When Employees Leave ›
Is an NDA or a non-compete better for protecting trade secrets?: They do different jobs. An NDA (confidentiality agreement) bars disclosing or using your secrets and is enforceable almost everywhere. It's the backbone of trade secret protection. A non-compete bars working for a rival at all and is heavily restricted: California, Minnesota, North Dakota, and Oklahoma ban most of them, and the FTC has tried to ban them nationally. For most employers, well-drafted NDAs plus invention-assignment agreements do the real work. Read more: Protecting Trade Secrets When Employees Leave ›
Do contractors own the work they create for me?: Usually yes, absent a written assignment. Unlike employees, an independent contractor owns the copyright in what they create by default, and "work made for hire" only covers narrow enumerated categories. To own a contractor's deliverables and any inventions, you need a signed agreement with a present-tense IP assignment ("hereby assigns") plus confidentiality terms. Without it, you may only hold an implied license, not ownership. Read more: Protecting Trade Secrets With Contractors & Overseas ›
How do I protect trade secrets when manufacturing overseas?: Bind every foreign supplier with confidentiality and IP-assignment terms before sharing anything, compartmentalize so no single factory sees the whole process, and pick your choice-of-law and forum carefully, often arbitration in a neutral seat. Register key IP locally where you can, since trade secret enforcement varies widely abroad. Practical controls (split tooling, watermarked files, audits) often matter more than the contract. Read more: Protecting Trade Secrets With Contractors & Overseas ›
Does an NDA with a foreign contractor actually work?: It can, but enforceability depends on where you have to sue. A U.S.-law NDA may be hard to enforce against a supplier in a country that won't recognize a U.S. judgment. Specify governing law, an arbitration seat under the New York Convention (enforceable in 170+ countries), and remedies. Pair the contract with need-to-know access limits so a breach can't reach your whole secret. Read more: Protecting Trade Secrets With Contractors & Overseas ›
What is compartmentalization and why does it matter with vendors?: Compartmentalization means giving each contractor or supplier only the slice of information they need to do their job: need-to-know access. If one factory makes a subassembly and another does final assembly, neither sees the complete process. It limits the damage from any single leak, strengthens your "reasonable measures" defense under the DTSA, and is often your only practical protection where legal enforcement is weak. Read more: Protecting Trade Secrets With Contractors & Overseas ›
Can I legally start a business that competes with my former employer?: In most cases, yes. This is especially true in California, where post-employment non-competes are void under Business and Professions Code § 16600 and employers face liability under § 16600.5 for trying to enforce them. What the law protects is fair competition using your general skill, knowledge, and experience. What it punishes is taking things: files, code, customer lists, and trade secrets, or soliciting customers and coworkers while still employed. The line is less about what business you start and more about what you carry into it and when you started building it. Read more: Quitting to Start a Competitor: The IP Checklist ›
What am I allowed to take with me when I leave a job?: Your general skills, professional experience, industry knowledge, publicly available information, and personal contacts you genuinely remember. That said, how far the remembered-rolodex idea stretches varies by state, and even memorized customer lists can qualify as trade secrets in many jurisdictions, including California. You may not take documents, source code, designs, pricing models, prospect databases, or anything else that belongs to the employer, in any format. Forwarding files to personal email or cloud storage on the way out is the single most common trigger for a lawsuit, and forensics will find it. Read more: Quitting to Start a Competitor: The IP Checklist ›
Can I prepare my new company while still employed?: Generally yes, within limits. The duty of loyalty lets employees make preparations to compete (forming an LLC, renting space, consulting a lawyer, lining up financing) but not actually compete while still on payroll. That means no soliciting your employer's customers, no recruiting your coworkers to defect (rules vary, but coordinated raids while employed are dangerous everywhere), no diverting business opportunities, and no building your product on company time or equipment. Officers and executives owe stricter fiduciary duties, so their preparation window is narrower. Read more: Quitting to Start a Competitor: The IP Checklist ›
Is the FTC ban on non-competes in effect in 2026?: No. The FTC's 2024 rule that would have banned most non-competes nationwide was set aside by a Texas federal court in Ryan, LLC v. FTC before it took effect. The FTC dropped its appeal in September 2025 and formally removed the rule from the Code of Federal Regulations effective February 12, 2026. The agency says it will still challenge abusive non-competes case by case under Section 5 of the FTC Act, but as of mid-2026 enforceability is governed by the state-by-state patchwork: void in California, restricted by income thresholds or notice rules in many states, and broadly enforceable if reasonable in others. Read more: Quitting to Start a Competitor: The IP Checklist ›
What are 'reasonable measures' to protect a trade secret?: Reasonable measures are the security steps courts require you to take to keep information secret under both the Defend Trade Secrets Act and the Uniform Trade Secrets Act. They include NDAs with everyone who touches the information, need-to-know access controls, IT security like encryption and multi-factor authentication, confidentiality markings, physical security, and onboarding and exit protocols. The law does not require perfect security, only measures that are reasonable under the circumstances given the information's value and your company's size. Read more: The Reasonable Secrecy Measures Checklist ›
Does a small startup have to take the same security steps as a big company?: No. The 'reasonable measures' standard scales with your resources and the value of the secret. Courts do not expect a five-person startup to run a Fortune 500 security operation. A small company can satisfy the standard with signed NDAs, restricted file access, password and multi-factor protection, and confidentiality markings. What courts punish is doing effectively nothing: sharing sensitive files openly, skipping agreements, and never limiting access. Read more: The Reasonable Secrecy Measures Checklist ›
Do I have to mark documents 'Confidential' to protect a trade secret?: It is not strictly required, but marking is powerful evidence and cheap to do. Labeling documents, files, and folders 'Confidential' removes any ambiguity about what you consider protected and shows you treated the information as a secret. Courts weigh marking heavily, and its absence is a favorite argument for defendants. Mark selectively, though. If you stamp everything 'Confidential,' the label loses meaning and can undercut you. Read more: The Reasonable Secrecy Measures Checklist ›
How do I prove I took reasonable measures if I get sued?: Documentation. Keep signed NDAs and invention-assignment agreements, access logs, records of who could see what and when, confidentiality policies, training sign-offs, and exit-interview checklists. When a dispute arises, you must show a judge the concrete steps you took before the theft, not describe them after the fact. Undocumented 'we were careful' claims routinely fail, so build the paper trail as you go, not in a crisis. Read more: The Reasonable Secrecy Measures Checklist ›
What damages can you recover for trade secret theft?: Under the DTSA and UTSA you can recover your actual loss plus the defendant's unjust enrichment not already counted in that loss, or (if those are hard to prove) a reasonable royalty for the unauthorized use. If the misappropriation was willful and malicious, a court may add exemplary damages of up to two times the compensatory award and order the losing side to pay your attorney's fees. Read more: Trade Secret Damages and Remedies ›
Can you get an injunction for trade secret misappropriation?: Yes. Injunctive relief is often the most important remedy. Courts can issue a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction within days to stop a secret from spreading, then a permanent injunction after trial. Injunctions can bar use or disclosure of the secret, require its return or destruction, and in some cases condition future use on paying a royalty. Speed matters. Sit on the problem and courts grow skeptical of the emergency. Read more: Trade Secret Damages and Remedies ›
How are trade secret damages calculated?: There are three main measures. Actual loss captures your lost profits, lost sales, or diminished value of the secret. Unjust enrichment captures the defendant's gains (profits, cost savings, or head-start value) not already reflected in your loss. A reasonable royalty is a fallback: what a willing licensee would have paid for the use. Plaintiffs usually retain a damages expert, and courts require the numbers be tied to the misappropriation, not speculation. Read more: Trade Secret Damages and Remedies ›
What is the statute of limitations for a trade secret claim?: Both the federal DTSA and the Uniform Trade Secrets Act impose a three-year statute of limitations. The clock starts when the misappropriation is discovered or, through reasonable diligence, should have been discovered, not when it first happened. A continuing misappropriation counts as a single claim, so the deadline runs from first discovery. New York, which never adopted the UTSA, applies its own common-law limitations period. Read more: Trade Secret Damages and Remedies ›
What counts as trade secret misappropriation?: Under the Defend Trade Secrets Act (18 U.S.C. § 1839) and the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, misappropriation is (1) acquiring a trade secret by improper means such as theft, bribery, or breach of a confidentiality duty, or (2) disclosing or using a trade secret without consent by someone who knew or should have known it was acquired improperly. Reverse-engineering and independent development are not misappropriation. They are lawful. Read more: Trade Secret Stolen? What to Do First ›
What should I do first if a trade secret is stolen?: Move fast in the first 72 hours. Preserve and forensically image relevant devices, pull access and download logs before anything is overwritten, and map exactly what was taken, by whom, and when. Send a preservation and cease-and-desist letter where appropriate, and call litigation counsel immediately so you can seek a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction. Courts are far less willing to grant emergency relief if you delayed. Read more: Trade Secret Stolen? What to Do First ›
What is DTSA ex parte seizure?: The DTSA (18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(2)) lets a court order federal marshals to seize stolen trade secrets (without notice to the defendant) but only in 'extraordinary circumstances,' where an ordinary injunction would be inadequate because the defendant would evade or destroy the property. It is rarely granted, requires a sworn showing of immediate and irreparable harm, and exposes you to damages if the seizure was wrongful. Read more: Trade Secret Stolen? What to Do First ›
How long do I have to sue for trade secret theft?: Both the DTSA and the Uniform Trade Secrets Act impose a three-year statute of limitations. The clock starts when the misappropriation is discovered or, by reasonable diligence, should have been discovered, not when it first occurred. A continuing pattern of misuse counts as a single claim, so you cannot restart the clock with each new use. Waiting also undercuts any argument that the harm is urgent and irreparable. Read more: Trade Secret Stolen? What to Do First ›
What legally qualifies as a trade secret?: Under the Defend Trade Secrets Act and the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, information qualifies as a trade secret if it (1) derives independent economic value from not being generally known or readily ascertainable by others who could profit from it, and (2) is the subject of reasonable efforts to keep it secret. That can include formulas, source code, customer lists, pricing models, manufacturing processes, and business plans, but only if you actually guard them. Read more: The Trade Secret Protection Playbook: A Founder's Guide ›
How is a trade secret different from a patent?: A patent gives you a 20-year monopoly in exchange for publicly disclosing the invention, and it protects you even against someone who independently invents the same thing. A trade secret can last forever (Coca-Cola's formula is the classic example), but only as long as it stays secret, and it gives you no protection against a competitor who reverse-engineers or independently discovers it. Trade secrets are best for things that are hard to reverse-engineer and would lose value once disclosed. Read more: The Trade Secret Protection Playbook: A Founder's Guide ›
Do I need an NDA to have a trade secret?: You are not legally required to have one, but NDAs are one of the clearest pieces of evidence that you took 'reasonable measures' to keep information secret, which is a legal requirement for protection. In practice, courts look at your whole confidentiality program: NDAs with employees, contractors, and partners, plus access controls, confidentiality markings, and IT security. Skipping NDAs makes it far harder to prove a trade secret existed at all. Read more: The Trade Secret Protection Playbook: A Founder's Guide ›
What should I do first if someone steals a trade secret?: Move fast: preserve evidence (device logs, access records, emails), identify exactly what was taken and when, and talk to a litigation attorney immediately, because you may be able to seek a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction to stop the information from spreading. The federal DTSA even allows ex parte seizure of stolen secrets in extraordinary cases. Delay hurts you. Courts are less willing to grant emergency relief if you sat on the problem. Read more: The Trade Secret Protection Playbook: A Founder's Guide ›
How do you create a trade secret inventory?: Run a cross-functional walkthrough, department by department, and list candidate items by category: technical, customer and commercial, financial, and negative know-how. Test each item individually against the independent-economic-value question, then record for each one what it is at a granular level, where it lives, who can reach it, what it cost to develop, and which measures protect it. Tier the results by value so protection scales, and put the whole exercise under counsel's direction so the working notes stay privileged. Refresh it on a cadence and at every departure. Read more: How to Inventory Your Company's Trade Secrets ›
Why does a trade secret inventory matter legally?: Two reasons. First, you cannot show reasonable measures for information you never identified, because there is no way to restrict, mark, or log access to an asset nobody catalogued. Second, you must eventually describe the secret with particularity. In California, Code of Civil Procedure section 2019.210 requires identification with reasonable particularity before discovery relating to the trade secret even begins. The inventory is where that description gets built, years before anyone needs it. Read more: How to Inventory Your Company's Trade Secrets ›
How specific does a trade secret description have to be?: Specific enough to separate your information from general knowledge in the trade and from the knowledge of people skilled in that trade. Catchall phrases and category labels like "our processes" or "confidential business information" are the classic failure. In Sysco Machinery Corp. v. DCS USA Corp. (4th Cir. 2025), the Fourth Circuit affirmed dismissal where the complaint listed vague categories of proprietary and financial information, effectively implying the company's entire business was a trade secret. Read more: How to Inventory Your Company's Trade Secrets ›
Can you claim an employee's skill and experience in your inventory?: No, and trying is actively harmful. General skill, training, and industry knowledge belong to the person and travel with them to their next job. If your inventory claims an engineer's professional expertise as company property, you hand the defense an easy argument that you over-claim generally, which taints the entries that were legitimate. Draw the line at your specific confidential information: the actual parameters, the actual curated data, not the ability to do the work. Read more: How to Inventory Your Company's Trade Secrets ›
Does my employer automatically own everything I create at work?: No. The default rules differ by type of intellectual property. Copyrightable works you create as an employee within the scope of your job belong to the employer automatically under the work-made-for-hire doctrine. Patentable inventions are the opposite: the individual inventor owns them unless a valid assignment agreement says otherwise, which the Supreme Court confirmed in Stanford v. Roche (2011). Trade secrets developed on the job generally belong to the employer, though your general skill and knowledge leave with you. In practice, most disputes are decided by the invention-assignment agreement you signed at hiring, not the defaults. Read more: Who Owns What You Create at Work? Employee IP, Explained ›
Who owns a patent for something an employee invents?: By default, the inventor does. U.S. patent law vests ownership in the individual inventor, and merely being employed (even being paid to do research) does not transfer title to the employer. That is why nearly every technology employer requires a signed invention-assignment agreement (often called a PIIA) transferring inventions to the company. Two narrower doctrines can also apply without a contract: the hired-to-invent doctrine, when you were employed specifically to solve that problem, and shop rights, which give the employer a nonexclusive license when you used company time or equipment. Read more: Who Owns What You Create at Work? Employee IP, Explained ›
Can my employer claim things I make on my own time?: Sometimes, depending on your agreement and your state. Broad assignment clauses often reach inventions made during your employment even off-hours, but roughly ten states void assignment of inventions you develop entirely on your own time, without employer resources, that don't relate to the employer's business or result from your work. Those states include California (Labor Code § 2870), Washington, Illinois, and Minnesota. If your side project uses company equipment, relates to what the company does, or grew out of your job duties, the employer can usually still claim it despite those statutes. Read more: Who Owns What You Create at Work? Employee IP, Explained ›
Do independent contractors keep the IP they create for a client?: Usually yes, absent a written agreement. That is the opposite of the rule for employees. A contractor's copyrightable work is not automatically a work made for hire; it only qualifies if it falls within nine narrow statutory categories and both sides signed a work-for-hire agreement, and patentable inventions stay with the contractor unless expressly assigned. Businesses that hire freelancers without signed IP assignments often discover, years later, that they merely have an implied license to use the work rather than ownership of it. Read more: Who Owns What You Create at Work? Employee IP, Explained ›
Did the court find that Abrasic's information was actually secret?: In part. Judge Tharp accepted that some of the compiled pricing, cost, and customer data could have economic value from not being generally known. The case failed on the second element: the company took almost no measures to keep the information secret, so it never qualified as a trade secret at all. Read more: Abrasic 90 v. Weldcote Metals: Real Secrets, No Protection, No Injunction ›
Why did taking the files not decide the case?: Trade-secret law protects information the owner actually treats as secret. The court assumed the defendants took CGW files, but wrongful taking is irrelevant if the information was never a trade secret. Because CGW failed the reasonable-measures element, there was no protectable secret to misappropriate, so the misconduct could not carry the injunction. Read more: Abrasic 90 v. Weldcote Metals: Real Secrets, No Protection, No Injunction ›
What secrecy measures would have changed the outcome?: The court listed routine steps CGW skipped: consistent confidentiality agreements for everyone with access, a written policy identifying what is confidential, employee training, need-to-know access limits with individual credentials, and exit procedures requiring return or deletion of company data. Adopting the ordinary baseline, not perfection, is what the element demands. Read more: Abrasic 90 v. Weldcote Metals: Real Secrets, No Protection, No Injunction ›
Do you have to own a trade secret to sue for its misappropriation under Pennsylvania law?: No. The Third Circuit held that the Pennsylvania Uniform Trade Secrets Act does not limit standing to owners. A party in lawful possession of a trade secret, such as a contractor holding a customer's proprietary information, may bring a misappropriation claim even without title to the information. Read more: Advanced Fluid Systems v. Huber: Possession, Not Ownership, Confers Standing to Sue ›
Why did lawful possession matter in Advanced Fluid Systems v. Huber?: The contract designated the proprietary hydraulic designs the exclusive property of the Virginia state authority that commissioned the work, and AFS conceded it had conveyed title. The court held that AFS still possessed the designs lawfully, because it retained and used them openly with the owner's knowledge and implied consent, and that this gave it a sufficient interest to sue the former employee and competitors who took them. Read more: Advanced Fluid Systems v. Huber: Possession, Not Ownership, Confers Standing to Sue ›
What was the outcome of the case?: The Third Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment for Advanced Fluid Systems in full, upholding an award of roughly $3.1 million: about $1.1 million in compensatory lost profits against all appellants, $1 million in exemplary damages under PUTSA against Kevin Huber alone, and $1 million in punitive damages on the fiduciary-duty claims against Huber, Livingston & Haven, and Clifton Vann. Read more: Advanced Fluid Systems v. Huber: Possession, Not Ownership, Confers Standing to Sue ›
Can you sue for trade secret misappropriation without direct proof of theft?: Often yes, at the pleading stage. In Ahern Rentals v. EquipmentShare, the Eighth Circuit held that allegations made on information and belief are not automatically insufficient when the proof lies in the defendant's sole possession, or when the belief rests on enough factual material to make misappropriation plausible. A plaintiff still must prove the claim later with evidence. Read more: Ahern Rentals v. EquipmentShare: Pleading Trade Secret Theft on Information and Belief ›
What does pleading on information and belief mean?: It means alleging a fact the plaintiff reasonably believes to be true but cannot yet confirm with direct evidence, often because the evidence is controlled by the defendant. Courts accept such allegations when they rest on a plausible factual basis rather than pure speculation, consistent with the plausibility standard of Twombly and Iqbal. Read more: Ahern Rentals v. EquipmentShare: Pleading Trade Secret Theft on Information and Belief ›
Why did the Eighth Circuit revive the claims against EquipmentShare?: The district court had dismissed the EquipmentShare claims on grounds tied to its dismissal of the related defendant. Because the Eighth Circuit reversed the dismissal of the misappropriation claim against that co-defendant, it vacated the EquipmentShare ruling so the district court could reconsider the claims in light of the corrected pleading standard. Read more: Ahern Rentals v. EquipmentShare: Pleading Trade Secret Theft on Information and Belief ›
Can an idea, as opposed to finished technology, be a trade secret under California law?: Yes. In Altavion the California Court of Appeal held that patentable design concepts kept secret can themselves be protectable trade secrets under CUTSA, provided they are specific enough, derive independent economic value from secrecy, and are the subject of reasonable efforts to keep them confidential. Read more: Altavion v. Konica Minolta: When Ideas Themselves Are Protectable Trade Secrets ›
Why did the NDA matter in Altavion v. Konica Minolta?: Altavion disclosed its digital-stamping design concepts to Konica Minolta under a non-disclosure agreement during partnership negotiations. The NDA established the reasonable secrecy measures and the confidential relationship, so when Konica Minolta filed patent applications on the disclosed concepts, that use was misappropriation. Read more: Altavion v. Konica Minolta: When Ideas Themselves Are Protectable Trade Secrets ›
What did Altavion recover?: The trial court awarded Altavion $1 million in compensatory damages plus $513,400 in prejudgment interest, for total damages of about $1.5 million, and roughly $3.3 million in attorneys' fees. The California Court of Appeal affirmed on May 8, 2014. Read more: Altavion v. Konica Minolta: When Ideas Themselves Are Protectable Trade Secrets ›
Did AMD have to prove the engineers gave anything to Nvidia?: No. The court held that AMD did not need to show actual use or disclosure to obtain a preliminary injunction. The improper acquisition of trade secrets, coupled with intent to convert them, was enough to support a likelihood of success and injunctive relief. Read more: AMD v. Feldstein: A Million Copied Files and the Limits of an Innocent Explanation ›
Was the case about what the engineers remembered, or what they copied?: What they copied. Employees may lawfully carry general skill and experience to a competitor. Feldstein turned on the copying of the employer's actual files to personal devices (conduct, not memory), which is why the general-skill defense had little purchase. Read more: AMD v. Feldstein: A Million Copied Files and the Limits of an Innocent Explanation ›
What role did the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act play?: AMD pleaded a CFAA claim alleging unauthorized or excess-authorized access to its protected network, alongside its trade-secret and contract claims. In the reported June 10, 2013 opinion on the motions to dismiss, Judge Hillman sided with the narrower, technological reading of authorized access, under which logging in with valid credentials is authorized even if the employee later misuses what he obtained. He declined to dismiss the CFAA count anyway, given the unsettled law and the incomplete record, but warned that the claim would be dismissed unless AMD could plead fraud, deception, or the circumvention of technological barriers. That CFAA discussion is what the reported opinion is most cited for. Read more: AMD v. Feldstein: A Million Copied Files and the Limits of an Innocent Explanation ›
Did AMN make all employee non-solicitation agreements illegal in California?: Not in so many words. The court voided the specific provision before it because it restrained the defendants' profession, and it cast serious doubt on Loral v. Moyes. Many courts have read AMN broadly, but its express holding is tied to its facts, and the outer boundary remains contested. Read more: AMN Healthcare v. Aya Healthcare: California's Ban Reaches the Employee Non-Solicit ›
Does AMN overrule Loral v. Moyes?: No. One Court of Appeal panel cannot overrule another. AMN declined to follow Loral and said it "doubt[ed] the continuing viability of Moyes post-Edwards," but a definitive resolution would have to come from the California Supreme Court or the Legislature. Read more: AMN Healthcare v. Aya Healthcare: California's Ban Reaches the Employee Non-Solicit ›
Could AMN have protected its nurse contacts as trade secrets instead?: Not on this record. The court found the asserted nurse identities and contact information were not protectable trade secrets, so the misappropriation theory could not substitute for the void covenant. Read more: AMN Healthcare v. Aya Healthcare: California's Ban Reaches the Employee Non-Solicit ›
Does Angelica Textile overrule the California supersession doctrine?: No. It applies the same "same nucleus of facts" test established in K.C. Multimedia, but from the plaintiff's side, confirming that claims with an independent factual basis are not displaced. It refines the doctrine rather than rejecting it. Read more: When the Secret Isn't the Wrong: Angelica Textile Services v. Park and the Limits of CUTSA Displacement ›
Why did the conversion claim survive when the trade-secret claim failed?: Because Angelica pleaded it as a claim over tangible property: the thousands of pages of documents Park kept after he was asked to return them. That theory does not depend on the documents being trade secrets, so there is no CUTSA claim for it to duplicate and displacement does not apply. Whether the documents had any value was left open on remand. Read more: When the Secret Isn't the Wrong: Angelica Textile Services v. Park and the Limits of CUTSA Displacement ›
What is the practical lesson for employers suing departing employees?: Build the complaint around independently wrongful conduct (breach of a loyalty or contractual duty, competing while employed, diverting opportunities) rather than relying solely on the taking of information. Those claims survive even if the trade-secret theory ultimately fails. Read more: When the Secret Isn't the Wrong: Angelica Textile Services v. Park and the Limits of CUTSA Displacement ›
Did Pegasystems win?: Partially. It did not win outright: the courts held the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's misappropriation finding, so Appian's claim survives and can be retried. But the ~$2 billion verdict was set aside and the VUTSA claims go back for a new trial on liability and damages alike. Read more: Appian v. Pegasystems: How a $2 Billion Trade-Secret Verdict Came Undone ›
What was wrong with the damages award?: Jury Instruction #14 let Appian treat Pega's total sales as damages unless Pega proved which portion was not attributable to the trade secrets. The Supreme Court of Virginia held that a plaintiff bears the burden of proving the defendant's wrongful act caused the damages it seeks, so the instruction misstated Virginia law. Read more: Appian v. Pegasystems: How a $2 Billion Trade-Secret Verdict Came Undone ›
Was the retrial limited to damages?: No. The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment as to the VUTSA claims and remanded for a new trial, and the Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed. Two of the four errors went to whether the information was a trade secret at all, so the retrial is not confined to the damages figure. Read more: Appian v. Pegasystems: How a $2 Billion Trade-Secret Verdict Came Undone ›
Do you have to prove money damages to win a trade-secret case in California?: No. Applied Medical confirms that misappropriation under the California Uniform Trade Secrets Act has only two elements: the existence of a trade secret and its improper acquisition, use, or disclosure. A plaintiff can obtain an injunction even if the jury awards zero damages, and can recover the attorney's fees incurred to obtain that relief where a contract provides for them. Applied's fees were awarded under its proprietary information agreement, not under the statute; statutory fees under Civil Code section 3426.4 require willful and malicious misappropriation. Read more: No Damages, Still Liable: Applied Medical v. Jarrells and the Costs of Cleaning Up a Trade-Secret Theft ›
Can an employer recover the cost of investigating a suspected theft?: Only partly. The court distinguished pure investigative costs, incurred to find out whether misappropriation happened, which are generally not recoverable, from costs incurred to stop or mitigate the misappropriation, which can qualify as actual loss under Civil Code section 3426.3. Read more: No Damages, Still Liable: Applied Medical v. Jarrells and the Costs of Cleaning Up a Trade-Secret Theft ›
Does this decision weaken California's strong protection of employee mobility?: Not directly. Section 16600 still voids most noncompetes. But Jarrells shows that trade-secret claims remain a powerful tool against departing employees who take confidential files, and that a clean exit without copied data is the only safe course. Read more: No Damages, Still Liable: Applied Medical v. Jarrells and the Costs of Cleaning Up a Trade-Secret Theft ›
Did Quick Point have to keep paying royalties even though anyone could now copy the keyholder?: Yes. The Court enforced the 2.5 percent perpetual royalty. Competitors were free to copy the unpatented design, but Quick Point had separately contracted for the right to sell it and for the head start it received, and it was held to that bargain. Read more: Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil: Collecting Royalties on a Patent That Never Issued ›
How is this different from Lear v. Adkins, where a licensee was allowed to stop paying?: Lear involved an issued patent the public had an interest in challenging. In Aronson no patent ever issued, so there was no federal monopoly to police and nothing improperly removed from public use, leaving ordinary contract law free to operate. Read more: Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil: Collecting Royalties on a Patent That Never Issued ›
Can a company still use this structure today?: Yes, with one caution from Kimble v. Marvel (2015): royalties tied to an issued patent cannot extend beyond its expiration. Royalties grounded in non-patent rights (know-how, trade secrets, or simply a contracted head start, as in Aronson) remain enforceable. Read more: Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil: Collecting Royalties on a Patent That Never Issued ›
Can something be a trade secret if it was not disclosed in your patent?: Yes, and that is the core of Atlantic Research v. Troy. The Federal Circuit invalidated reissue claims for a single-support handguard because the specification did not describe that design, meaning the inventor never disclosed it to the public in the patent. But the court affirmed that the evidence could support a trade secret covering the same single-support design, precisely because it was not in the patent. What a patent fails to disclose can remain protectable as a trade secret. Read more: Atlantic Research v. Troy: The Line Between Patent and Trade Secret ›
Why were the reissue claims invalid?: For lack of written description under 35 U.S.C. 112. The original specification described a handguard supported at two points, the receiver sleeve and the barrel nut. The reissue claims 31 to 36 covered a handguard supported at only one point, the barrel nut. The Federal Circuit held those claims exceeded the scope of what the inventor actually disclosed, so they were not supported by the specification and were invalid. Read more: Atlantic Research v. Troy: The Line Between Patent and Trade Secret ›
Did Atlantic Research win its trade-secret claim outright?: Not outright. The Federal Circuit affirmed the denial of judgment as a matter of law on the trade-secret claim, holding the evidence was legally sufficient to support a trade secret in the single-support design. But the court also vacated the jury verdict and ordered a new trial because an extraneous item, a clamp, reached the jury room and the trial court had not adequately investigated the resulting taint. The doctrinal point on the patent and trade-secret boundary stands; the verdict itself required a retrial. Read more: Atlantic Research v. Troy: The Line Between Patent and Trade Secret ›
Did ATS Tree Services v. FTC uphold the non-compete ban permanently?: No. The court denied a preliminary injunction, meaning it declined to block the rule while the case proceeded and found the plaintiff unlikely to win. It was not a final judgment on the rule's validity, and the rule was later set aside in separate litigation and formally removed by the FTC. Read more: ATS Tree Services v. FTC: The Court That Let the Non-Compete Ban Stand ›
Why did the Pennsylvania court reach a different result than the Texas court?: The Eastern District of Pennsylvania read Section 6(g) of the FTC Act as granting substantive rulemaking authority over unfair methods of competition and found the major questions doctrine inapplicable. The Northern District of Texas in Ryan v. FTC read the statute narrowly and concluded the FTC lacked that authority. Read more: ATS Tree Services v. FTC: The Court That Let the Non-Compete Ban Stand ›
Is the FTC non-compete rule in effect now?: No. As of July 2026 the rule is dead. The Northern District of Texas set it aside nationwide, the FTC voted in September 2025 to drop its appeals, and the Commission removed the rule from the Code of Federal Regulations effective February 12, 2026. Non-competes remain governed by state law. Read more: ATS Tree Services v. FTC: The Court That Let the Non-Compete Ban Stand ›
Did the Ninth Circuit hold that the DTSA never reaches conduct beginning before 2016?: No. It held the opposite as a matter of law: pre-enactment misappropriation "does not preclude a claim arising from post-enactment misappropriation or continued use" of the same secret. The plaintiff-favorable timing rule is the durable holding of the case. Read more: Attia v. Google: The DTSA Reaches Pre-Enactment Secrets, But Only If They Survive ›
Then why did Attia lose?: Because the timing rule presupposes a surviving secret, and Attia had none. Google's 2012 patent applications published the Engineered Architecture information, extinguishing its trade-secret status before the DTSA took effect in 2016. With no protectable secret remaining, Attia lacked standing to assert a DTSA claim, and the continued-use theory had nothing to operate on. Read more: Attia v. Google: The DTSA Reaches Pre-Enactment Secrets, But Only If They Survive ›
What is the practical lesson for a company deciding between patents and trade secrets?: The two cannot protect the same disclosed information at once. Filing and publishing a patent application destroys trade-secret status in whatever it discloses. Attia is a vivid illustration: the very patent filings at the center of the dispute are what defeated the trade-secret claim founded on the same technology. Read more: Attia v. Google: The DTSA Reaches Pre-Enactment Secrets, But Only If They Survive ›
Did it matter that the DOIL content was partly public?: No. The court held that a compilation's protectability turns on the time, effort, and expense of assembling it, not on how much of the content is independently public. The validated, assembled whole was the trade secret. Read more: AvidAir v. Rolls-Royce: Legends, NDAs, and the Modest Bar for Reasonable Secrecy ›
Does a leak prove the owner's security was unreasonable?: No. The Eighth Circuit held that a third party's breach of a confidentiality duty does not necessarily negate the owner's reasonable efforts. Misappropriation is the harm the law remedies, not evidence that protection was forfeited. Read more: AvidAir v. Rolls-Royce: Legends, NDAs, and the Modest Bar for Reasonable Secrecy ›
What measures did Rolls-Royce actually take?: It marked the DOILs with proprietary-rights legends and distributed them only to Authorized Maintenance Centers bound by an agreement prohibiting disclosure of confidential materials. The court found those steps reasonable. Read more: AvidAir v. Rolls-Royce: Legends, NDAs, and the Modest Bar for Reasonable Secrecy ›
What made this case "extraordinary" when most seizure requests are denied?: The defendants had provided false and misleading information, hidden and moved computer files, previously attempted to delete data, and possessed a high level of technical skill that could defeat an ordinary injunction. That combination satisfied the statute's requirements that a Rule 65 order would be inadequate and that the defendants would destroy or conceal the evidence if given notice. Read more: Axis Steel Detailing v. Prilex: When 'Extraordinary Circumstances' Are Actually Met ›
Does being a sophisticated computer user justify seizure?: Not by itself. In Axis Steel, technical proficiency mattered because it was coupled with a demonstrated willingness to delete, hide, and move data and to provide false information. Capacity to spoliate, paired with evidence of propensity to do so, is what moved the needle. Read more: Axis Steel Detailing v. Prilex: When 'Extraordinary Circumstances' Are Actually Met ›
What safeguards applied once seizure was granted?: The DTSA requires the narrowest seizure necessary, minimal disruption of legitimate operations, custody of the seized material by the court, a hearing within seven days, and a security bond to cover damages from a wrongful or excessive seizure. The order's later amendment reflects the supervised, revisable nature of the remedy. Read more: Axis Steel Detailing v. Prilex: When 'Extraordinary Circumstances' Are Actually Met ›
What is the difference between New York's approach and California's?: California voids employee non-competes categorically under section 16600. New York enforces a covenant to the extent it is reasonable and protects a legitimate interest, and BDO Seidman permits courts to narrow an overbroad covenant rather than void it, provided the employer acted in good faith. Read more: BDO Seidman v. Hirshberg: New York's Blueprint for Partially Enforcing an Overbroad Covenant ›
Which clients could BDO actually protect?: Only the clients Hirshberg came to serve through the firm's investment and introductions. The covenant could not reach clients he had brought to BDO or recruited himself, or clients with whom he never developed a relationship through firm services. Read more: BDO Seidman v. Hirshberg: New York's Blueprint for Partially Enforcing an Overbroad Covenant ›
Does every overbroad New York covenant get rewritten by the court?: No. Partial enforcement is available where the employer demonstrates good faith and the absence of overreaching or coercive use of bargaining power. Courts withhold the narrowing remedy from employers who impose sweeping, unreasonable restraints, to avoid rewarding overreach. Read more: BDO Seidman v. Hirshberg: New York's Blueprint for Partially Enforcing an Overbroad Covenant ›
Did the Third Circuit adopt the inevitable disclosure doctrine?: Not in name. It held that Pennsylvania law requires a "substantial threat" of trade secret misappropriation to support an injunction, and it specifically declined to require proof that disclosure was inevitable, a lower bar than the strict inevitable-disclosure formulation. Read more: Bimbo Bakeries v. Botticella: How the Third Circuit Enjoined an Executive Without Demanding Inevitability ›
Why was Botticella enjoined if he hadn't yet disclosed anything?: Because the standard targets threatened, not just accomplished, misappropriation. The combination of valuable secrets, a move to a direct competitor, concealment of the new job, and forensic evidence of file access established a substantial threat of misappropriation. Read more: Bimbo Bakeries v. Botticella: How the Third Circuit Enjoined an Executive Without Demanding Inevitability ›
Was this a permanent ban on his working for Hostess?: No. The order was a preliminary injunction entered while the misappropriation claim was litigated: a temporary restraint pending resolution of the merits, not a final, indefinite bar. Read more: Bimbo Bakeries v. Botticella: How the Third Circuit Enjoined an Executive Without Demanding Inevitability ›
How can a real trade secret be copied without liability?: BladeRoom concerned a contractual duty of confidentiality, not the abstract existence of a secret. Paragraph 12 made the parties' obligations survive the end of the deal talks, but a closing proviso terminated the whole agreement two years after signing. Once the agreement terminated, the contractual obligation not to use the information ended, so use after that date could not breach the NDA even if the information was still secret. The Ninth Circuit did not decide when Emerson's conduct actually occurred; it sent that question back for a new trial. Read more: BladeRoom v. Emerson: The Two-Year NDA That Ate a $60 Million Verdict ›
Why did English law matter?: The NDA selected English law to govern its interpretation. The Ninth Circuit therefore applied English contract principles and found the district court had misread the termination clause under those principles, relying only on the contract's purpose and context without ever analyzing the clause's natural and ordinary meaning. Read more: BladeRoom v. Emerson: The Two-Year NDA That Ate a $60 Million Verdict ›
What single drafting change would have avoided this?: A survival clause tied to the right event. Paragraph 12 already made obligations survive the end of negotiations, but not the end of the agreement, and the proviso then terminated the agreement at two years. Language stating that confidentiality obligations continue for a set number of years after termination of the agreement itself, or for the life of the trade secret, would have kept the disputed conduct within the protected window. Read more: BladeRoom v. Emerson: The Two-Year NDA That Ate a $60 Million Verdict ›
What did BlueEarth Biofuels v. Hawaiian Electric decide about UTSA preemption?: The Hawaii Supreme Court, answering certified questions, held that the Hawaii Uniform Trade Secrets Act displaces non-contract civil claims based on the misuse of confidential or commercially valuable information, whether or not that information rises to the level of a statutorily defined trade secret. This is the 'majority approach' to UTSA preemption. Read more: When the Trade-Secret Statute Swallows the Tort: BlueEarth Biofuels v. Hawaiian Electric and UTSA Preemption ›
Does HUTSA preempt every claim related to confidential information?: No. The court held that HUTSA displaces conflicting tort and restitution claims that are based on misappropriation, but claims survive to the extent they rest on wrongful conduct independent of the misappropriation, and contract claims are not displaced. Read more: When the Trade-Secret Statute Swallows the Tort: BlueEarth Biofuels v. Hawaiian Electric and UTSA Preemption ›
How did this case reach the Hawaii Supreme Court?: The U.S. District Court for the District of Hawaii certified questions of state law to the Hawaii Supreme Court because the scope of HUTSA preemption was unsettled and would control the federal litigation between BlueEarth and the Hawaiian Electric defendants. Read more: When the Trade-Secret Statute Swallows the Tort: BlueEarth Biofuels v. Hawaiian Electric and UTSA Preemption ›
Can a patent application destroy someone else's trade secret?: It can destroy the secrecy of the information it discloses. In BondPro v. Siemens Judge Posner explained that published patent applications are studied by inventors in the field, so a secret disclosed in one will ordinarily lose its trade-secret status once published. That is true even if the person who filed the application learned the information from the trade-secret owner. The filer may still be liable for the wrongful disclosure, but the information itself enters the public domain. Read more: BondPro v. Siemens: A Patent Application Can Vaporize a Trade Secret ›
Why did BondPro lose even though the jury found for it?: The district court granted judgment as a matter of law for Siemens and the Seventh Circuit affirmed. The decisive problem was value. Neither company ever used the process commercially, Siemens concluded it cost more than its existing method, and the related patent application was rejected. Judge Posner found the inference compelling that the process had no measurable commercial value, and BondPro also failed to define its secret with the specificity, such as precise temperatures and durations, that a trade-secret claim requires. Read more: BondPro v. Siemens: A Patent Application Can Vaporize a Trade Secret ›
What does BondPro teach about combining patents and trade secrets?: That the patent system is a tripwire for trade-secret strategy. Filing a patent application publishes the disclosed information roughly eighteen months later, so an inventor cannot keep as a trade secret what the application reveals. Companies must decide, invention by invention, which elements to patent and which to hold in confidence, and must recognize that a competitor's or partner's filing can expose the same information and end its secret status. Read more: BondPro v. Siemens: A Patent Application Can Vaporize a Trade Secret ›
What exactly did the Florida statute do, and why was that fatal?: It barred using the direct molding process to copy an unpatented boat hull for sale. The Court held this gave patent-like exclusivity to a publicly disclosed, unpatented design, intruding on the field Congress reserved through the patent laws, and so was preempted by the Supremacy Clause. Read more: Bonito Boats v. Thunder Craft: When a State Cannot Re-Create the Patent Monopoly ›
If states cannot protect such designs, how does trade-secret law survive?: Because trade-secret law protects only information kept secret and permits reverse engineering and independent discovery. It withdraws nothing from the public domain. The Florida statute reached designs already publicly sold and forbade the reverse engineering that trade-secret law allows, the opposite posture. Read more: Bonito Boats v. Thunder Craft: When a State Cannot Re-Create the Patent Monopoly ›
Did boat-hull designers end up with any protection after this case?: Yes. Congress responded in 1998 with the Vessel Hull Design Protection Act (17 U.S.C. §§ 1301–1332), a federal sui generis scheme granting roughly ten years of registration-based protection for original hull designs: federal protection supplying what the states could not. Read more: Bonito Boats v. Thunder Craft: When a State Cannot Re-Create the Patent Monopoly ›
Can a confidentiality agreement really be an illegal noncompete?: In California, yes. Brown v. TGS holds that if a confidentiality provision is so broad that it effectively prevents an employee from working in the field, it operates as a de facto noncompete and is void under Business and Professions Code section 16600 regardless of its label. Read more: Brown v. TGS Management: When a Confidentiality Clause Becomes an Illegal Noncompete ›
Why did the overbroad definition fail even though it had exceptions?: The principal exception (for information "generally known in the securities industry through legal means") excluded only information that had no value to the trader's work. What remained inside the definition was everything he needed to practice his profession, so the carve-out did not meaningfully narrow the restraint. Read more: Brown v. TGS Management: When a Confidentiality Clause Becomes an Illegal Noncompete ›
Does this let an employee disregard a confidentiality clause?: No. Genuine trade secrets and properly scoped proprietary information remain protectable. Brown targets clauses that reach far beyond that, claiming all industry knowledge and thereby restraining the employee's right to work. Read more: Brown v. TGS Management: When a Confidentiality Clause Becomes an Illegal Noncompete ›
Did the court reject the DTSA seizure remedy as improper?: No. Judge Davila did not hold that seizure was unavailable or that Brunswick failed any particular statutory finding on the merits. He held that seizure was "unnecessary" because a delivery order plus a TRO would protect the same devices, a direct application of the statute's requirement that seizure issue only where Rule 65 or other equitable relief "would be inadequate." Read more: Brunswick Rail v. Sultanov: Why Courts Keep Saying No to DTSA Seizure ›
What relief did Brunswick actually obtain?: A preservation order directed at the nonparty email hosts, a temporary restraining order barring access to or modification of the devices and data, an order requiring Sultanov to deliver the laptop and phone to the court at the upcoming hearing, and an order to show cause on a preliminary injunction. The court denied the DTSA seizure and denied expedited discovery for lack of good cause. Read more: Brunswick Rail v. Sultanov: Why Courts Keep Saying No to DTSA Seizure ›
When is DTSA seizure actually available?: Only "in extraordinary circumstances" and only when an applicant satisfies all of § 1836(b)(2)(A)(ii)'s findings, including that ordinary equitable relief would be inadequate. In practice that means situations where giving the defendant notice would itself cause the harm: an evasive, absconding, or out-of-reach defendant, as the contrasting history of Mission Capital Advisors v. Romaka illustrates. Read more: Brunswick Rail v. Sultanov: Why Courts Keep Saying No to DTSA Seizure ›
Did the court hold that recipes can never be trade secrets?: No. It held that these recipes (for basic American dishes prepared by obvious methods) were readily ascertainable and lacked both the novelty Washington law requires and proven independent economic value. A genuinely unusual, closely guarded formulation can still qualify. Read more: Buffets v. Klinke: Why a Recipe for Macaroni and Cheese Is Not a Trade Secret ›
Why did the training manuals fail even though they were internal documents?: Because OCB did not take reasonable steps to keep them secret. Employees could take the manuals home and were never told the contents were confidential, so the secrecy element of the Washington UTSA was not met. Read more: Buffets v. Klinke: Why a Recipe for Macaroni and Cheese Is Not a Trade Secret ›
What is the single most useful lesson for businesses?: Secrecy is proved by conduct, not intent. If you want internal materials protected, mark them confidential, control access and copying, and tell employees the materials are secret. Do so before, not after, a dispute arises. Read more: Buffets v. Klinke: Why a Recipe for Macaroni and Cheese Is Not a Trade Secret ›
What did Cadence v. Avant! decide about the statute of limitations?: The California Supreme Court held that under the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, a plaintiff's claim against a given defendant for continuing misappropriation arises only once (at the time of the initial misappropriation), subject to the discovery rule. Each later misuse or disclosure augments that single continuing claim rather than starting a new limitations period. Read more: Cadence Design Systems v. Avant!: Continuing Misappropriation Is a Single Claim ›
Why does treating misappropriation as a single claim matter?: It cuts both ways. A defendant cannot be sued twice for the same course of conduct against the same plaintiff, but the plaintiff also cannot revive an untimely claim by pointing to a recent use; the three-year clock runs from when the initial misappropriation was or should have been discovered. Read more: Cadence Design Systems v. Avant!: Continuing Misappropriation Is a Single Claim ›
Was there a criminal case behind Cadence v. Avant!?: Yes. Santa Clara County prosecutors charged Avant! and several executives with trade-secret theft, conspiracy, receiving stolen property, and securities fraud arising from copied Cadence source code. The defendants pleaded no contest; the company and executives paid roughly $195 million in restitution to Cadence plus tens of millions in fines, and the civil case was later settled for about $265 million. Read more: Cadence Design Systems v. Avant!: Continuing Misappropriation Is a Single Claim ›
Did Jarrow do anything beyond hiring a competitor's employee?: Yes. The case did not punish ordinary hiring. The record showed Ashurst transferred confidential Caudill documents (by email while still employed and then on a disc at Jarrow's request) and that Jarrow used that compiled research to launch a competing product in four months. Hiring talent is lawful; acquiring the former employer's research files with the hire is not. Read more: Caudill Seed v. Jarrow Formulas: When a Researcher Carries the Library Out the Door ›
Why did a compilation of public information qualify as a trade secret?: Under the combination-trade-secret doctrine the Sixth Circuit applied, a new combination of otherwise known steps or processes can be protectable. Caudill's secret was the unique assemblage and integration of its research and development, not any single public fact within it. Read more: Caudill Seed v. Jarrow Formulas: When a Researcher Carries the Library Out the Door ›
Was this a federal Defend Trade Secrets Act case?: No. The misappropriation occurred in 2011, before the DTSA, so the claim arose under the Kentucky Uniform Trade Secrets Act. The evidentiary and strategic lessons, however, apply directly to DTSA litigation today. Read more: Caudill Seed v. Jarrow Formulas: When a Researcher Carries the Library Out the Door ›
Can a company be liable for breaching an NDA even if the technology was not patentable?: Yes. In Celeritas the Federal Circuit affirmed a breach-of-contract verdict against Rockwell even after holding the related patent invalid as anticipated. A non-disclosure agreement is enforced according to its own terms, independent of whether the disclosed technology is patentable or remains secret. Read more: Celeritas v. Rockwell: The NDA That Outlived an Invalid Patent ›
Does an NDA obligation end when the confidential information becomes public?: Not automatically. The court found the de-emphasis technology had not entered the public domain when Rockwell breached, because it was not readily ascertainable without specialized equipment. Whether disclosure ends the duty depends on the NDA's terms and the timing of the alleged breach, not on a general rule. Read more: Celeritas v. Rockwell: The NDA That Outlived an Invalid Patent ›
How could Celeritas recover $57.6 million on contract while losing on the patent?: The jury returned a $57,658,000 verdict on the contract claim as well as the patent claim, and Celeritas had stipulated to accept only the highest single award. After the district court remitted the patent award and doubled it for willfulness to $34,968,320, the contract verdict was the highest, so judgment was entered on the contract claim alone. Invalidating the patent therefore took nothing away from the recovery. Read more: Celeritas v. Rockwell: The NDA That Outlived an Invalid Patent ›
Did the court hold that LinkedIn contacts are trade secrets?: No. It held only that they could not be declared non-secret as a matter of law. Whether Oakes's LinkedIn connections were trade secrets, or were too public to qualify, was a genuine factual dispute for a jury to decide. Read more: Cellular Accessories v. Trinitas: Are a Salesman's LinkedIn Connections His, or the Company's? ›
Why didn't the customer database claim succeed outright?: Under California law, a customer list is a trade secret only if it reflects the employer's investment and is not readily ascertainable. Whether Cellular's compilation met that standard was disputed, so the court denied the defendants' motion rather than declaring the ACT file unprotected. Read more: Cellular Accessories v. Trinitas: Are a Salesman's LinkedIn Connections His, or the Company's? ›
What should employers take from the case?: That ownership of networked relationships is not automatic. An employer that wants connections built on platforms like LinkedIn treated as its asset should address the point in policy, recognize that inviting employees to network openly on the platform is exactly what the defendants used to argue the contacts were not secret, and protect the underlying customer data with concrete secrecy measures. Read more: Cellular Accessories v. Trinitas: Are a Salesman's LinkedIn Connections His, or the Company's? ›
Did the Ninth Circuit rule that key codes could never be trade secrets?: No. The court did not decide whether the serial number to key code correlations were trade secrets. It assumed they could be and still reversed, because Chicago Lock failed to prove the codes were acquired by improper means. The holding turns on the means of acquisition, not on the secret status of the information. Read more: Chicago Lock v. Fanberg: Why Reverse Engineering Is Not Improper Means ›
Why did it matter that the locksmiths, not the Fanbergs, disassembled the locks?: The improper means inquiry follows the chain of acquisition. The locksmiths reverse engineered locks their own customers owned, which is proper means, and they owed no duty of confidence to Chicago Lock. Because each link in the chain was lawful, the Fanbergs' compilation and publication inherited no taint of misappropriation. Read more: Chicago Lock v. Fanberg: Why Reverse Engineering Is Not Improper Means ›
Can a manufacturer stop customers from reverse engineering a product it sells?: Not through trade secret law alone. Chicago Lock argued for an implied duty on lock owners not to disclose their key codes. The court refused, reasoning that such a duty would give the manufacturer patent-like exclusivity without a patent, colliding with federal patent policy that leaves unpatented articles free to be copied. Read more: Chicago Lock v. Fanberg: Why Reverse Engineering Is Not Improper Means ›
Can scraping publicly available data be trade-secret misappropriation?: Yes, it can. In Compulife v. Newman the Eleventh Circuit held that using a bot to scrape an enormous volume of otherwise public quotes may be improper means of acquiring a trade secret, even though pulling individual quotes by hand would not be. The volume and method, not just the public availability, matter. Read more: When a Bot Crosses the Line: Compulife v. Newman and Scraping as Improper Means ›
What was the trade secret if the underlying numbers were public?: The secret was Compulife's database and the proprietary formula and methodology behind its life-insurance quotes, not any single quote. The court recognized that an organized, valuable compilation can be a trade secret even when its individual components are publicly accessible. Read more: When a Bot Crosses the Line: Compulife v. Newman and Scraping as Improper Means ›
Why is this case important for AI and data scraping?: It established that automated collection at a scale no human could achieve can constitute improper means under trade-secret law, giving data owners a theory against mass scraping that does not depend on hacking or breaching a contract. It is frequently cited in disputes over scraping and AI training data. Read more: When a Bot Crosses the Line: Compulife v. Newman and Scraping as Improper Means ›
What did the Fifth Circuit decide in Computer Sciences Corp. v. Tata?: It affirmed a roughly $168 million trade-secret judgment, including $56 million in compensatory damages and $112 million in exemplary damages, and upheld findings that Tata's use of CSC's confidential material was unauthorized and willful and malicious. Read more: Avoided Costs as Unjust Enrichment: Computer Sciences Corp. v. Tata and a $168 Million Affirmance ›
How were the damages measured?: Largely through unjust enrichment based on avoided development costs. The court held a trade-secret plaintiff may recover the benefit a defendant gained by skipping the cost of independently developing the technology, even absent additional harm to the plaintiff beyond its actual losses. Read more: Avoided Costs as Unjust Enrichment: Computer Sciences Corp. v. Tata and a $168 Million Affirmance ›
Did Tata win anything on appeal?: Partly. The Fifth Circuit vacated the injunction and remanded for a narrowed one, removing the bar on Tata's future use of post-misappropriation BaNCS material as duplicative of the damages award and directing the district court to clarify who was bound under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d)(2). It otherwise affirmed, and the Supreme Court denied certiorari on June 15, 2026 (No. 25-1107). Read more: Avoided Costs as Unjust Enrichment: Computer Sciences Corp. v. Tata and a $168 Million Affirmance ›
Why did ConFold's misappropriation claim fail?: ConFold conceded its container design was not a trade secret, and no patent or copyright protected it. Under the default rule, information outside those regimes is free to use, so Polaris's adoption of a similar design (disclosed to it in a bid) created no liability. Read more: ConFold v. Polaris: When a Design Is Neither a Trade Secret Nor Covered by the NDA ›
Didn't the nondisclosure agreement protect the design?: No. The court read the "Logistics Consulting Version" NDA to cover only ConFold's logistics-analysis work (its software, documentation, and consulting), not the container designs it submitted later in response to a separate request for proposals. Read more: ConFold v. Polaris: When a Design Is Neither a Trade Secret Nor Covered by the NDA ›
What should a vendor do to protect a design disclosed in bidding?: Secure protection that fits the disclosure: a patent or design-patent application where appropriate, a confidentiality agreement that expressly covers submitted designs, an explicit reservation of rights in the proposal, or staged disclosure. A narrowly scoped NDA written for a different purpose will not do the work. Read more: ConFold v. Polaris: When a Design Is Neither a Trade Secret Nor Covered by the NDA ›
Does signing an NDA automatically protect everything I disclose?: No. Convolve holds the opposite. If the agreement specifies how information becomes "Confidential Information" (for example, by marking or by a follow-up writing), then information disclosed without following those steps may fall outside the protected category entirely. Read more: Convolve v. Compaq: When the NDA's Own Marking Rules Defeat the Secret ›
Why couldn't Convolve rely on an implied duty of confidence?: Because the parties had an express agreement defining the scope of their confidential relationship. The court declined to imply a broader duty that would have relieved Convolve of the designation obligations it had agreed to perform. Read more: Convolve v. Compaq: When the NDA's Own Marking Rules Defeat the Secret ›
Is this decision binding precedent?: It is a nonprecedential Federal Circuit opinion, so it is not binding. But it is widely cited because it cleanly illustrates a principle of general application: contractual secrecy measures will be enforced as written, and failing to meet them can forfeit trade-secret protection. Read more: Convolve v. Compaq: When the NDA's Own Marking Rules Defeat the Secret ›
Why did the court rule against Digital Assurance if there was evidence of copying?: Because copying is not misappropriation of a trade secret unless the information copied is a trade secret. The court found that Digital Assurance had not explained how its customer list was compiled or shown that the information was not readily available from a public source, so it had not met its burden to show the list was a trade secret. That failure defeated its motion to seal the list, and it is the same failure that would defeat the ex parte seizure application it had filed alongside, because seizure requires a likelihood of success in showing a trade secret. Evidence that a departing employee took files does not cure a failure to establish the files were protectable. Read more: Digital Assurance v. Pendolino: The Merits Gate on DTSA Seizure ›
Does a customer list automatically qualify as a trade secret?: No. A customer list can be a trade secret, but only if the owner shows it was built through effort and expense and is not readily ascertainable from public sources such as directories, public filings, or the customers themselves. Courts require the owner to explain the method of compilation and the secrecy measures taken. A bare list of names and contacts that could be reassembled from public information does not qualify. Read more: Digital Assurance v. Pendolino: The Merits Gate on DTSA Seizure ›
What should a plaintiff prove to obtain a DTSA seizure order?: All eight findings in 18 U.S.C. 1836(b)(2)(A)(ii), including that ordinary equitable relief would be inadequate, that the applicant is likely to succeed in showing misappropriation of a trade secret, that immediate and irreparable injury will occur, that the defendant has the property, and that the defendant would evade or destroy it if given notice. Pendolino shows that the trade-secret element is itself a hard gate: a plaintiff that cannot establish it never gets near the rest of the list. Read more: Digital Assurance v. Pendolino: The Merits Gate on DTSA Seizure ›
Does the Defend Trade Secrets Act apply outside the United States?: It can. In dmarcian v. dmarcian Europe the Fourth Circuit applied 18 U.S.C. 1837, which extends the DTSA to conduct occurring outside the United States when an act in furtherance of the offense was committed in the United States. Because the Dutch defendant originally accessed the trade secrets from servers located in the United States and there was a domestic nexus to the use or disclosure, the court found the statutory requirement for extraterritorial application satisfied. The DTSA is not limited to purely domestic theft. Read more: dmarcian v. dmarcian Europe: The DTSA Reaches Across Borders ›
How did a US court get personal jurisdiction over a Dutch company?: Through purposeful availment. The Fourth Circuit found that the Dutch entity had initiated a business relationship with a North Carolina company, entered a multi-year cooperative agreement contemplating performance there, held regular virtual and in-person meetings, and depended on North Carolina-based servers and support. Those contacts were enough to satisfy the state long-arm statute and constitutional due process, so the Dutch defendant could be sued in North Carolina. Read more: dmarcian v. dmarcian Europe: The DTSA Reaches Across Borders ›
What happened to the parallel Dutch litigation and comity arguments?: The defendant moved to dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds, arguing that Dutch courts were an adequate alternative forum. The Fourth Circuit held the district court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting that argument, because the Dutch courts could not effectively adjudicate the US trademark claims and so were not an adequate forum. It affirmed personal jurisdiction, the forum non conveniens ruling, and the preliminary injunction in full, noting the district court had fashioned a narrow injunction independently of the Dutch case. The only part vacated and remanded was the amount of the civil contempt sanction, which the court found insufficiently explained as compensatory. As of July 2026 the dispute has continued through further proceedings, and the European entity was later renamed DMARC Advisor BV. Read more: dmarcian v. dmarcian Europe: The DTSA Reaches Across Borders ›
Why did Double Eagle lose even though its former employee took thousands of files?: Taking files is not the same as taking trade secrets. The Tenth Circuit held that Double Eagle never identified its claimed secrets with enough particularity and produced no evidence that they were not readily ascertainable through proper means. It had posted aspects of its specifications on its own website, it let customers repeat its prices, and the customer drawings came from the customers rather than from Double Eagle. Read more: Name the Secret or Lose: Double Eagle Alloys v. Hooper and the Particularity Trap ›
What does it mean to identify a trade secret with particularity?: A plaintiff must describe the claimed secret specifically enough to distinguish it from general knowledge and skill in the trade. At summary judgment that means producing evidence that could satisfy the statutory definition. Pointing to broad categories like specifications, pricing, and customer drawings, without showing what is uniquely secret about them, is not enough. Read more: Name the Secret or Lose: Double Eagle Alloys v. Hooper and the Particularity Trap ›
What should employers do to protect specifications and pricing?: Treat secrecy as an ongoing practice, not a label. Limit access, mark and segregate confidential material, avoid publishing specifications on public websites, use NDAs with customers and vendors, and be prepared to articulate exactly what is secret and why it has value. Read more: Name the Secret or Lose: Double Eagle Alloys v. Hooper and the Particularity Trap ›
What was the holding in DoubleClick v. Henderson?: A New York trial court preliminarily enjoined two former DoubleClick executives from competing for six months, finding a likelihood of success on misappropriation, breach of the duty of loyalty, and unfair competition, and finding a high probability that they would inevitably use DoubleClick's confidential information in their planned rival venture. Read more: DoubleClick v. Henderson: Tailoring an Injunction to a Secret's Shelf Life ›
Why was the injunction limited to six months?: The court reasoned that DoubleClick's proprietary information, its business plan, projections, pricing, and client data, would lose most of its value within roughly six months given how quickly the internet advertising industry changed. The remedy was matched to the shelf life of the secrets rather than imposed for a fixed default term. Read more: DoubleClick v. Henderson: Tailoring an Injunction to a Secret's Shelf Life ›
Did the executives have non-compete agreements?: The reported basis for relief did not rest on an enforceable non-compete. The court relied on trade-secret misappropriation, the employees' breach of their duty of loyalty, and evidence they had planned the competing venture on company time, together supporting an inevitable-disclosure-style injunction. Read more: DoubleClick v. Henderson: Tailoring an Injunction to a Secret's Shelf Life ›
Did moving to California free Hermalyn from his noncompete?: No. The First Circuit affirmed a preliminary injunction applying Massachusetts law and enforcing the noncompete, including in California. The court held that Hermalyn failed to show California's policy against noncompetes was a 'materially greater' interest than Massachusetts's interest in enforcing the agreement he signed. Read more: Crossing the State Line Won't Erase Your Noncompete: DraftKings v. Hermalyn and the Choice-of-Law Battle ›
Why did Massachusetts law govern instead of California's noncompete ban?: The parties' contract chose Massachusetts law, and Massachusetts conflicts rules usually honor that choice. To escape it, Hermalyn had to satisfy all three prongs of the exception: that Massachusetts law would contravene a fundamental California policy, that California had a materially greater interest, and that California's law would otherwise control. The court resolved the appeal on the second prong alone, assuming without deciding the others. Read more: Crossing the State Line Won't Erase Your Noncompete: DraftKings v. Hermalyn and the Choice-of-Law Battle ›
Does this mean California's noncompete ban can always be avoided?: No. The ruling is fact-specific and arose at the preliminary-injunction stage. California has a strong policy against noncompetes, and a different employee, contract, or set of facts could produce a different result. The case shows the analysis is functional, not automatic. Read more: Crossing the State Line Won't Erase Your Noncompete: DraftKings v. Hermalyn and the Choice-of-Law Battle ›
Did the Christophers break any law by flying over the plant?: The court never decided. It expressly declined to consider whether the flight pattern violated any federal aviation regulation, saying that regardless of whether the flight was legal or illegal in that sense, the espionage was an improper means of discovering the secret. No trespass or breach of confidence was involved. The decision's significance is precisely that liability for trade-secret misappropriation can attach to acquisition by "improper means" without any showing that the conduct was otherwise unlawful. Read more: Du Pont v. Christopher: Spying From the Sky as 'Improper Means' ›
Why wasn't Du Pont penalized for leaving the process visible from the air?: The court held that reasonable precautions are measured against foreseeable and preventable intrusions. Requiring Du Pont to roof a plant still under construction to defeat aerial photography would impose an enormous expense to thwart an extraordinary, hard-to-anticipate method, which is more than the law demands. Read more: Du Pont v. Christopher: Spying From the Sky as 'Improper Means' ›
Is reverse engineering treated the same way?: No, and that contrast is central. Reverse engineering of a lawfully obtained product and independent development are "proper" means; they are the fair labor the law encourages. Christopher condemns shortcuts that bypass that labor through devious acquisition, a distinction later statutes expressly preserved. Read more: Du Pont v. Christopher: Spying From the Sky as 'Improper Means' ›
Did DuPont ultimately keep the $919.9 million?: No. The Fourth Circuit vacated that judgment in 2014. In 2015 Kolon pleaded guilty and was ordered to pay an $85 million criminal fine and $275 million in restitution to DuPont, and the parties separately settled the civil case on confidential terms. Read more: DuPont v. Kolon: A $919.9 Million Kevlar Verdict and the Fragile Foundations of Trade-Secret Damages ›
Why was such a large verdict reversed?: Not because of the damages calculation, but because the trial court had excluded evidence Kolon wanted to use to show some of the claimed information was already public. That evidence went to whether the material qualified as a trade secret at all. Read more: DuPont v. Kolon: A $919.9 Million Kevlar Verdict and the Fragile Foundations of Trade-Secret Damages ›
How do exemplary damages here compare to federal law?: Under the Virginia Uniform Trade Secrets Act, punitive damages cannot exceed twice the compensatory award or $350,000, whichever is less, so the $350,000 ceiling controls in any large case. The federal Defend Trade Secrets Act, by contrast, allows exemplary damages up to twice the compensatory award with no dollar cap. Read more: DuPont v. Kolon: A $919.9 Million Kevlar Verdict and the Fragile Foundations of Trade-Secret Damages ›
Did the court abolish inevitable disclosure in New York?: No. It recognized that New York courts entertain the theory but held it should be applied only in the rarest of cases absent evidence of actual misappropriation, and it set out the demanding factors a claimant must satisfy. Read more: EarthWeb v. Schlack: The Decision That Tried to Cage Inevitable Disclosure ›
Why did EarthWeb lose if Schlack was going to a competitor?: Two reasons. The narrowly drafted non-compete did not actually cover the ITworld.com job, and the court refused to use inevitable disclosure to expand the covenant beyond its terms. On the facts, the roles and the secrets were not the kind of near-identical, highly valuable match the doctrine demands. Read more: EarthWeb v. Schlack: The Decision That Tried to Cage Inevitable Disclosure ›
What are the EarthWeb factors?: Whether the employers directly compete with the same or similar products or services; whether the new position is nearly identical to the old; and whether the trade secrets are highly valuable to both employers. Courts across the country still cite this framework. Read more: EarthWeb v. Schlack: The Decision That Tried to Cage Inevitable Disclosure ›
Does memorizing a customer list instead of copying it avoid liability?: No. In Ed Nowogroski Insurance, Inc. v. Rucker, the Washington Supreme Court held that the form of the information is immaterial under the Uniform Trade Secrets Act. Using a memorized customer list can be misappropriation just as taking a written copy would be. Read more: Ed Nowogroski Insurance v. Rucker: Why Memorizing a Customer List Is Still Theft ›
Can an employee use general skill and knowledge learned on the job?: Yes. Trade secret law protects the employer's confidential compiled information, not the employee's general skills, experience, or the identities of customers the employee can independently recall as a matter of ordinary professional knowledge. Read more: Ed Nowogroski Insurance v. Rucker: Why Memorizing a Customer List Is Still Theft ›
Does Edwards ban every non-compete in California?: It voids employee non-competition agreements that restrain a person from engaging in a lawful profession, trade, or business unless they fall within a statutory exception, such as the sale of a business's goodwill or the dissolution of a partnership or LLC. Those statutory categories survive; ordinary employee covenants do not. Read more: Edwards v. Arthur Andersen: California Closes the Door on the 'Narrow-Restraint' Exception ›
Did the court decide whether trade secrets can justify a non-compete?: No. The court expressly declined to address the asserted "trade secret exception" to section 16600, leaving open how restraints aimed at protecting trade secrets interact with the statute. Read more: Edwards v. Arthur Andersen: California Closes the Door on the 'Narrow-Restraint' Exception ›
Why does an interference-with-economic-advantage case control non-compete law?: Because Edwards's tort claim required proof that Andersen's conduct was independently wrongful, the court had to decide whether the underlying non-compete and the demanded release were lawful. The non-compete holding was necessary to the judgment, not passing commentary. Read more: Edwards v. Arthur Andersen: California Closes the Door on the 'Narrow-Restraint' Exception ›
What did the Seventh Circuit hold in Epic Systems v. Tata?: It affirmed $140 million in compensatory damages for the benefit Tata gained from misappropriating Epic's confidential information, affirmed the district court's vacatur of a separate $100 million compensatory award as unsupported, and vacated the $280 million punitive award as exceeding the outermost limit of the due process guarantee, remanding with instructions to reduce punitive damages to at most $140 million, a one-to-one ratio. Read more: Epic Systems v. Tata: Due Process Caps Trade-Secret Punitive Damages ›
How can a punitive award violate due process if a state statute allowed it?: The court held that compliance with Wisconsin's statutory two-to-one cap does not by itself satisfy due process. The constitutional guideposts on reprehensibility, ratio, and comparable penalties apply independently, and on this record the court concluded that a two-to-one ratio exceeded the outermost limit of the due process guarantee because Tata's conduct, while reprehensible, was not egregious and the compensatory award was already substantial. Read more: Epic Systems v. Tata: Due Process Caps Trade-Secret Punitive Damages ›
Did Tata escape liability for taking Epic's information?: No. Tata remained liable, and the $140 million compensatory award for the benefit it gained was affirmed. The appeal narrowed the damages, leaving in place the district court's vacatur of an unsupported $100 million compensatory component and capping punitive damages at $140 million, but the core misappropriation liability stood. Read more: Epic Systems v. Tata: Due Process Caps Trade-Secret Punitive Damages ›
Does sharing information without an NDA automatically destroy a trade secret?: Not by itself, but it is powerful evidence of failure. Fail-Safe holds that a total absence of any confidentiality measures during business discussions can defeat the reasonable-measures element as a matter of law. An NDA is the most common precaution, though not the only one. Read more: Fail-Safe v. A.O. Smith: No NDA, No Trade Secret ›
Can a court decide the reasonable-measures question on summary judgment?: Yes. While reasonableness is often a jury question, the Seventh Circuit held that where a plaintiff took no precautions at all, a court can resolve the element as a matter of law without sending it to trial. Read more: Fail-Safe v. A.O. Smith: No NDA, No Trade Secret ›
Why did signing A.O. Smith's one-way NDA not help Fail-Safe?: That agreement protected A.O. Smith's information, not Fail-Safe's. Fail-Safe never asked A.O. Smith to keep Fail-Safe's disclosures confidential, so the information Fail-Safe handed over went out without any contractual restriction. Read more: Fail-Safe v. A.O. Smith: No NDA, No Trade Secret ›
Did the Court eliminate the 'substantial competitive harm' test entirely?: Yes. The Court held that the test, invented by the D.C. Circuit in 1974, has no basis in the statutory text of Exemption 4 and is no longer good law. A submitter no longer has to prove competitive injury to keep commercial information confidential. Read more: What Counts as 'Confidential': Food Marketing Institute v. Argus Leader and the Rewrite of FOIA Exemption 4 ›
What does a company now have to show to qualify under Exemption 4?: At minimum, that the information is both commercial or financial and customarily and actually kept private. The Court reserved whether the government must also give an assurance of confidentiality, because that condition was satisfied on the facts. Read more: What Counts as 'Confidential': Food Marketing Institute v. Argus Leader and the Rewrite of FOIA Exemption 4 ›
Is this a trade-secret ruling?: Not directly. It interprets a FOIA disclosure exemption, but it matters enormously to anyone who submits sensitive commercial data to a federal agency, because it widens what the government can withhold and reduces the risk that confidential business information becomes public through a records request. Read more: What Counts as 'Confidential': Food Marketing Institute v. Argus Leader and the Rewrite of FOIA Exemption 4 ›
Was Henry Schein v. Cook really one of the first cases under the DTSA?: Yes. The Defend Trade Secrets Act took effect in May 2016, and in June 2016 Judge Jon S. Tigar of the Northern District of California granted one of the earliest temporary restraining orders under the new federal statute, making the decision an important early data point on how courts would apply it. Read more: The DTSA's First Test: Henry Schein v. Cook and Why Courts Reach for a TRO, Not Seizure ›
Did the court order a civil seizure under the DTSA?: No, and Henry Schein never asked for one. Although the DTSA created a dramatic ex parte civil-seizure remedy, the company applied for an ordinary temporary restraining order, which the court granted in part. The court did refuse the company's request to have a forensics expert mirror Cook's personal devices, calling that too great an intrusion to allow before Cook had a chance to respond, which suggests how far courts are from treating seizure as routine. Read more: The DTSA's First Test: Henry Schein v. Cook and Why Courts Reach for a TRO, Not Seizure ›
What did the employee in Henry Schein v. Cook allegedly do?: Henry Schein alleged that Jennifer Cook forwarded confidential customer practice reports from her work email to her personal email before resigning, kept her company laptop for two weeks, and accessed the company's computer system after she had left, threatening established customer relationships. Read more: The DTSA's First Test: Henry Schein v. Cook and Why Courts Reach for a TRO, Not Seizure ›
Does New York recognize the inevitable disclosure doctrine?: Yes, but cautiously. Visentin applied the doctrine rather than rejecting it, and still denied relief because IBM could not identify the threatened secrets with particularity, show that the roles were nearly identical, or establish bad faith. Read more: IBM v. Visentin: When New York Recognized Inevitable Disclosure and Still Said No ›
Why did IBM lose even though Visentin was joining a direct competitor?: Direct competition alone is not enough. The court found IBM's secrets described too generally, the two jobs not sufficiently similar, and Visentin's conduct (taking no documents and offering client restrictions) inconsistent with any inevitable misuse. Read more: IBM v. Visentin: When New York Recognized Inevitable Disclosure and Still Said No ›
How much did the four-day hearing matter?: Considerably. The evidentiary record let the court test IBM's theory against the actual scope of the new role and Visentin's behavior, rather than accepting the inference that a senior executive must inevitably disclose what he knows. Read more: IBM v. Visentin: When New York Recognized Inevitable Disclosure and Still Said No ›
Did IDX lose because its software wasn't proprietary?: No. The court accepted that some elements, such as a real-time error-checking algorithm, could be genuine trade secrets. IDX lost because it never identified its secrets with the required specificity and pointed instead at features users could observe. Read more: IDX v. Epic: A Trade Secret You Cannot Describe Is a Trade Secret You Cannot Protect ›
What does it mean to identify a trade secret "with particularity"?: It means describing the specific information claimed as secret in enough detail to separate it from publicly known or readily ascertainable material, so the court can test secrecy, value, and misappropriation against a defined target rather than a vague reference to a whole product. Read more: IDX v. Epic: A Trade Secret You Cannot Describe Is a Trade Secret You Cannot Protect ›
Why can't the plaintiff just identify the secret later, at trial?: Because every other element depends on knowing what the secret is. Without an early, specific identification, discovery becomes a fishing expedition and the defendant cannot fairly litigate independent development or public availability. Read more: IDX v. Epic: A Trade Secret You Cannot Describe Is a Trade Secret You Cannot Protect ›
What are "avoided costs" and why did they shrink the award?: Avoided costs measure the research-and-development expense a defendant saved by misappropriating rather than independently developing technology. They are a valid unjust-enrichment proxy under the DTSA, but the court found that awarding their full value and enjoining future sales compensated Insulet twice for the same forward-looking benefit, so it eliminated the overlapping portion. Read more: Insulet v. EOFlow: A $452 Million Verdict, an Avoided-Cost Theory, and the Limits of Trade-Secret Recovery ›
Why did the exemplary damages fall so far?: The DTSA caps exemplary damages at two times the compensatory (unjust-enrichment) award, so cutting the compensatory base to about $25.8 million lowered the ceiling to $51.6 million. The court landed well under it. The jury had found willful and malicious misappropriation only as to the CAD files, the occlusion-detection algorithm, and the design-history file, and the design-history-file damages were eliminated as duplicative, so doubling the two surviving willful components ($14.6 million and $2.2 million) yielded roughly $33.6 million rather than the jury's $282 million. Read more: Insulet v. EOFlow: A $452 Million Verdict, an Avoided-Cost Theory, and the Limits of Trade-Secret Recovery ›
Did the statute-of-limitations issue threaten the whole verdict?: It ended it. On May 28, 2026, the Federal Circuit held that Insulet knew or reasonably should have known of the misappropriation by March 2019, more than three years before it filed in August 2023, and reversed the judgment as time-barred. The damages and the worldwide injunction fell with it. The district court had itself flagged the accrual question as genuinely unsettled. Read more: Insulet v. EOFlow: A $452 Million Verdict, an Avoided-Cost Theory, and the Limits of Trade-Secret Recovery ›
Does InteliClear require a plaintiff to identify every trade secret with particularity to survive summary judgment?: No. The Ninth Circuit held that identifying at least one trade secret with sufficient particularity creates a triable issue. Broad or hedging catch-all language does not defeat the claim so long as one secret is described concretely enough to separate it from general knowledge in the field. Read more: InteliClear v. ETC Global: When Must a DTSA Plaintiff Pin Down Its Trade Secrets? ›
Can a court grant summary judgment on trade-secret identification before discovery has occurred?: Only rarely. ETC moved the day after discovery opened, and the panel held the district court abused its discretion by refusing InteliClear's Rule 56(d) request to defer a ruling until discovery proceeded, because whether information is a trade secret is ordinarily a question of fact that the plaintiff is entitled to develop through discovery. Read more: InteliClear v. ETC Global: When Must a DTSA Plaintiff Pin Down Its Trade Secrets? ›
What counts as identifying a trade secret with sufficient particularity?: The description must distinguish the claimed secret from matters of general knowledge or skill in the trade. InteliClear pointed to specific database tables, columns, account identifiers, codes, and the methodology by which components interrelate, which the court found particular enough to reach a jury. Read more: InteliClear v. ETC Global: When Must a DTSA Plaintiff Pin Down Its Trade Secrets? ›
How does the DTSA apply to a Chinese defendant at all?: Through 18 U.S.C. § 1837, which extends the Act to conduct outside the United States when the offender is a U.S. person or organization, or when an act in furtherance of the offense occurred in the United States. In Inventus, the alleged mass downloading of documents that originated at Inventus's Illinois facility, by employees who then left for ACE, is the kind of domestic act that supplies the hook. The court did not squarely rule on Section 1837; it cited the section for the DTSA's worldwide injunctive relief. Read more: Inventus Power v. Shenzhen Ace: The DTSA Follows Trade Secrets to China ›
Did the court rule that the defendant misappropriated trade secrets?: No. The May 18, 2021 decision denied dismissal on forum non conveniens grounds. It kept the case in Illinois. It is a forum ruling, not a final merits determination on misappropriation. Read more: Inventus Power v. Shenzhen Ace: The DTSA Follows Trade Secrets to China ›
Why was China found to be an inadequate forum?: More precisely, ACE failed to show that it was adequate, which is where the burden sat. On the submissions before it the court found China presently unavailable because pandemic travel restrictions would keep U.S. witnesses away, and it was not particularly convinced that comparable injunctive relief was available to Inventus in China or that a Chinese court could require compliance with its orders outside China. That stood in contrast to the U.S. court's worldwide TRO, with which the defendant had confirmed compliance. Read more: Inventus Power v. Shenzhen Ace: The DTSA Follows Trade Secrets to China ›
Can the ITC block imports over trade-secret theft that happened entirely in another country?: Yes. In the Certain Botulinum Toxin Products investigation the ITC found a Section 337 violation based on trade-secret misappropriation that occurred in South Korea between Korean companies, and imposed a 21-month import ban on the resulting product. Following the Federal Circuit's decision in TianRui Group v. ITC, Section 337 can reach wholly foreign trade-secret misappropriation so long as the injury is felt in a domestic industry through importation into the United States. Read more: The Botox Rival Case: Section 337 Reaches Foreign Trade-Secret Theft ›
What exactly did the ITC find and reverse?: The Commission found a violation as to misappropriation of Medytox's manufacturing-process trade secrets and issued a 21-month limited exclusion order against Daewoong's product, sold in the United States as Jeuveau, together with a cease-and-desist order against its US distributor Evolus. But it reversed the administrative law judge's finding that the Clostridium botulinum bacterial strain itself was a protectable trade secret, narrowing the basis of the violation to the manufacturing processes rather than the strain. Read more: The Botox Rival Case: Section 337 Reaches Foreign Trade-Secret Theft ›
Is the ITC decision still in force?: No. After the Commission's December 2020 determination, the parties reached settlements in 2021, including licensing arrangements involving the US distributor of Daewoong's product. The Commission rescinded the exclusion and cease-and-desist orders on May 3, 2021, the Federal Circuit dismissed the related appeals as moot, and the Commission voted on October 28, 2021 to vacate its final determination on remand. Neither the orders nor the determination is in effect, though the decision remains a leading example of Section 337's reach over foreign trade-secret theft. Read more: The Botox Rival Case: Section 337 Reaches Foreign Trade-Secret Theft ›
Does this order mean broad confidentiality agreements are unenforceable?: No. The order does not hold that the agreements are void or unenforceable as a matter of contract law. It holds that, by failing to permit voluntary regulatory reporting, the language violated a federal whistleblower-protection rule and exposed the firm to civil penalties. An NDA can remain enforceable between the parties and still trigger Rule 21F-17 liability; the two questions are independent. Read more: When a Confidentiality Clause Becomes a Federal Violation: The SEC's $18 Million J.P. Morgan Whistleblower Order ›
Will a whistleblower carve-out weaken my trade-secret protection?: It should not. A properly drafted carve-out exempts only protected disclosures to government authorities, not disclosures to competitors, the press, or the public. The agreement's core secrecy obligations, and its value as evidence of "reasonable measures" to maintain secrecy and as an independent breach-of-contract claim, remain intact. Read more: When a Confidentiality Clause Becomes a Federal Violation: The SEC's $18 Million J.P. Morgan Whistleblower Order ›
Did the SEC have to show that a whistleblower was actually silenced?: No. The Commission did not allege that any client was deterred or that JPMS ever enforced the clause. Its theory is that restrictive language alone impedes potential whistleblowers. That prophylactic approach has not yet been tested in contested litigation, so its ultimate validity in court remains uncertain. But it is the SEC's operative enforcement standard. Read more: When a Confidentiality Clause Becomes a Federal Violation: The SEC's $18 Million J.P. Morgan Whistleblower Order ›
Why did Kadant lose its trade-secret claim but win on trademark?: The court analyzed each claim on its own merits. Kadant could not show its technical specifications were protectable secrets or that the defendants took them improperly rather than reverse-engineering available products, so the trade-secret injunction was denied. The trademark claim turned on a different question (likelihood of consumer confusion from the defendants' use of similar three-letter acronyms), which Kadant did establish. Read more: Kadant v. Seeley: Reverse Engineering as a Complete Answer ›
Is reverse engineering always a defense to trade-secret misappropriation?: It is a proper means only when the product reverse-engineered was lawfully acquired, typically by ordinary market purchase. It is not a defense where the defendant obtained the item or the underlying information by improper means or in breach of a duty, such as a contractual non-use restriction. Read more: Kadant v. Seeley: Reverse Engineering as a Complete Answer ›
What does Kadant teach trade-secret plaintiffs?: Do not rely on the inference that fast replication proves theft. Identify specific, genuinely secret information; show it could not have been readily reverse-engineered or otherwise lawfully obtained; and marshal direct evidence that the defendant actually used improper means. Read more: Kadant v. Seeley: Reverse Engineering as a Complete Answer ›
Does CUTSA "preempt" common-law claims in the constitutional sense?: No. Courts often use "preemption," but the more precise term is statutory displacement or supersession. There is no federal-state conflict; rather, the California Legislature chose to make CUTSA the exclusive civil remedy for conduct amounting to trade-secret misappropriation, and section 3426.7(b) supplies that exclusivity by negative implication. Read more: The 'Same Nucleus of Facts': K.C. Multimedia v. Bank of America and the Birth of CUTSA Supersession ›
Can a plaintiff plead trade-secret misappropriation and a tort claim in the alternative?: Yes, but the tort claim survives only to the extent it rests on facts distinct from the misappropriation. A claim that depends entirely on the same taking-and-use conduct will be displaced, regardless of how it is captioned. Read more: The 'Same Nucleus of Facts': K.C. Multimedia v. Bank of America and the Birth of CUTSA Supersession ›
What about claims based on confidential information that is not a trade secret?: K.C. Multimedia did not resolve this. The question of whether CUTSA displaces claims over information that fails the trade-secret definition was later confronted in Silvaco and remains contested among federal courts applying California law. Read more: The 'Same Nucleus of Facts': K.C. Multimedia v. Bank of America and the Birth of CUTSA Supersession ›
Did Kewanee hold that trade secrets are always preferable to patents?: No. It held only that state trade-secret law is not preempted, so the choice is legally available. The Court in fact predicted that holders of strong, clearly patentable inventions would usually prefer patents, because trade-secret protection is weaker against reverse engineering and independent discovery. Read more: Secrecy or Monopoly: What Kewanee Oil v. Bicron Still Teaches About the Patent–Trade-Secret Choice ›
Can I keep an invention secret for years and then patent it?: Generally no. Under Metallizing Engineering Co. v. Kenyon Bearing (2d Cir. 1946) and Helsinn v. Teva (2019), secret commercial use or a confidential sale more than the statutory period before filing can forfeit or bar the patent. Secret commercialization and a later patent are largely incompatible. Read more: Secrecy or Monopoly: What Kewanee Oil v. Bicron Still Teaches About the Patent–Trade-Secret Choice ›
Is Kewanee still good law after the 2016 Defend Trade Secrets Act?: Yes. The DTSA created a federal civil cause of action for misappropriation but did not displace state trade-secret law or disturb Kewanee's holding that patent law does not preempt trade-secret protection. The decision remains the foundational authority on the coexistence of the two regimes. Read more: Secrecy or Monopoly: What Kewanee Oil v. Bicron Still Teaches About the Patent–Trade-Secret Choice ›
What did Learning Curve Toys v. PlayWood decide about reasonable secrecy?: The Seventh Circuit held that whether a trade-secret owner took reasonable measures to protect secrecy is ordinarily a question of fact for the jury, not a question of law for the judge. It reinstated a jury verdict for PlayWood, finding that an oral confidentiality agreement and limited disclosure to a few company representatives could reasonably be found sufficient. Read more: Learning Curve Toys v. PlayWood: Reasonable Secrecy Is a Jury Question ›
Does a trade secret have to be in actual use to be protectable?: No. The court rejected any requirement of continuous commercial use. A concept can have the requisite economic value from not being generally known even if the owner has not yet exploited it. Potential value, including the ability to license the idea, is enough. Read more: Learning Curve Toys v. PlayWood: Reasonable Secrecy Is a Jury Question ›
Is a written NDA required to protect a trade secret?: Not necessarily. The court accepted that an oral confidentiality agreement, together with disclosure to only a limited number of people in a confidential setting, could satisfy the reasonable-efforts requirement. The law demands reasonableness under the circumstances, not perfection. Read more: Learning Curve Toys v. PlayWood: Reasonable Secrecy Is a Jury Question ›
Did the court use the DTSA's seizure provision to take the laptop?: No. The court authorized the seizure through a Rule 65 temporary restraining order. It treated the DTSA's § 1836(b)(2) seizure mechanism as a separate, more demanding remedy reserved for situations in which Rule 65 relief would be inadequate. Read more: Magnesita Refractories v. Mishra: Seizing a Laptop Without the DTSA Seizure Statute ›
Why did the defendant's Rule 64 argument fail?: Because Rule 64 governs the seizure of property to secure satisfaction of a potential judgment, whereas the TRO seized the laptop to preserve evidence. Different purpose, different rule. Rule 64 did not control and supplied no basis for returning the laptop. Read more: Magnesita Refractories v. Mishra: Seizing a Laptop Without the DTSA Seizure Statute ›
Can any trade-secret plaintiff seize a laptop through a TRO instead of the DTSA?: Where the goal is to preserve evidence and the defendant is within the court's reach, Magnesita shows a Rule 65 TRO can do it, subject to Rule 65's own safeguards. The DTSA seizure statute remains the path for cases where ordinary equitable relief cannot achieve the protective purpose. Read more: Magnesita Refractories v. Mishra: Seizing a Laptop Without the DTSA Seizure Statute ›
What did the plaintiff do wrong in Mallet?: It defined its trade secrets only by broad category (formulas, manuals, customer data, and the like) rather than identifying the specific information claimed. The Third Circuit held that the district court could not assess the merits or fashion an injunction without a more precise identification. Read more: Mallet v. Lacayo: Why a Trade-Secret Injunction Collapsed for Lack of Specificity ›
Does a plaintiff have to reveal the secret formula to satisfy this standard?: Not necessarily. The court required specificity sufficient to identify what is protected and to show it is not publicly available; a detailed description of the value-conferring characteristics can satisfy that without publicly disclosing the secret itself. Read more: Mallet v. Lacayo: Why a Trade-Secret Injunction Collapsed for Lack of Specificity ›
Is Mallet limited to preliminary injunctions?: The decision arose at the injunction stage, where the specificity demand is acute because relief restrains conduct. Its logic (that you must identify the secret before evaluating the claim) also informs how courts approach identification later in a case. Read more: Mallet v. Lacayo: Why a Trade-Secret Injunction Collapsed for Lack of Specificity ›
What did the Ninth Circuit actually decide in the 2010 Bratz appeal?: On an interlocutory appeal it vacated the equitable relief that transferred essentially the entire Bratz brand to Mattel, meaning the constructive trust and the copyright injunction. The court held that the employee-invention agreement's assignment of "inventions" was ambiguous as to whether it captured ideas, that any copyright in the preliminary sketches and sculpt was "thin," and that imposing a constructive trust over the whole franchise was an abuse of discretion. It did not vacate the $10 million damages award, expressing no opinion on whether the verdict should stand. Read more: Mattel v. MGA Entertainment: Who Owns an Employee's Idea? ›
Did Mattel own Carter Bryant's Bratz idea?: The court did not decide that it did. It held that whether Bryant's contract assigned mere ideas (as opposed to tangible inventions) was ambiguous and had to be resolved by a jury weighing extrinsic evidence, not decided as a matter of law in Mattel's favor. Read more: Mattel v. MGA Entertainment: Who Owns an Employee's Idea? ›
How does this case relate to trade secrets?: The larger Mattel–MGA war was fought over ownership and alleged theft of commercially valuable, secret product concepts and information. On a later retrial a jury found that Mattel had misappropriated MGA's trade secrets, but the Ninth Circuit vacated that verdict and the related damages in 2013, holding the counterclaim was not compulsory and should never have been tried. The episode still underscores how disputes over employee-generated ideas blend contract, copyright, and trade-secret law. Read more: Mattel v. MGA Entertainment: Who Owns an Employee's Idea? ›
What is the Metallizing forfeiture rule?: An inventor who commercially exploits an invention in secret for more than the statutory grace period before filing a patent application forfeits the right to a patent. Judge Learned Hand held that the inventor must choose: keep the invention as a trade secret, or seek the patent monopoly, but not first profit in secrecy and then patent to extend protection. Read more: Metallizing Engineering v. Kenyon Bearing: Secret Commercial Use Forfeits the Patent ›
How is secret use by the inventor different from secret use by someone else?: The distinction is who is using the invention. Prior secret commercial use by a third party generally does not invalidate a later patent, because it does not inform the public. But secret commercial exploitation by the inventor himself triggers forfeiture. The bar is personal to the inventor as a condition of the patent right. Read more: Metallizing Engineering v. Kenyon Bearing: Secret Commercial Use Forfeits the Patent ›
Does Metallizing still matter after the America Invents Act?: Yes. Courts continue to apply the forfeiture principle, and the Supreme Court's 2019 decision in Helsinn v. Teva confirmed that even secret or confidential commercial sales can trigger the on-sale bar under the AIA. The strategic lesson endures: you cannot commercialize in secret indefinitely and then patent to reset the clock. Read more: Metallizing Engineering v. Kenyon Bearing: Secret Commercial Use Forfeits the Patent ›
Can something be a trade secret if all of its parts are publicly known?: Yes. Metallurgical Industries holds that a unique combination of publicly available elements can be a protectable trade secret, even though no single component is itself secret, where the particular assembly provides a competitive advantage and is kept confidential. Read more: A Secret Built From Public Parts: Metallurgical Industries v. Fourtek and the Combination Trade Secret ›
Does telling a few business partners destroy a trade secret?: Not necessarily. The court held that a holder may divulge information to a limited extent without losing trade-secret status. Metallurgical's disclosures, to a prospective furnace builder and to a paying licensee, were not public announcements and were made to further its own economic interests, so they did not extinguish the secrecy its other evidence suggested. Read more: A Secret Built From Public Parts: Metallurgical Industries v. Fourtek and the Combination Trade Secret ›
Is novelty required for trade-secret protection?: Not in the patent sense. Patent-grade inventiveness appears nowhere in the criteria the court drew from the Restatement of Torts: secrecy, the value the information gives the holder over competitors who do not know it, and the cost of developing it. As the opinion put it, that the scientific principles involved are generally known does not necessarily refute a claim of trade secrets. Read more: A Secret Built From Public Parts: Metallurgical Industries v. Fourtek and the Combination Trade Secret ›
Did Metron win the appeal?: Largely. The Sixth Circuit reversed the displacement of the contract claim, the statute-of-limitations dismissal, and the no-trade-secret ruling, remanding for further proceedings. It affirmed summary judgment only for Root Wellness, on the narrow ground that Root was formed after the secret was extinguished by publication. Read more: Metron Nutraceuticals v. Cook: The Contract Carve-Out That Survives UTSA Displacement ›
Does the Ohio UTSA ever displace contract claims?: Under this prediction, no. A plain breach-of-contract claim is preserved by the statute's savings clause even when it protects a trade secret. The Act primarily displaces tort and restitutionary claims that restate a misappropriation theory. Read more: Metron Nutraceuticals v. Cook: The Contract Carve-Out That Survives UTSA Displacement ›
Why does patent publication matter to a trade-secret case?: Once confidential information is disclosed in a published patent application, it enters the public domain and loses trade-secret status. Misappropriation must rest on conduct (and ideally damages) tied to the period before publication. Read more: Metron Nutraceuticals v. Cook: The Contract Carve-Out That Survives UTSA Displacement ›
What measures did the court credit as reasonable?: Employee confidentiality agreements and NDAs with outside parties, physical controls such as locked doors, badges, and cameras, network controls including firewalls and VPN, plus need-to-know internal distribution and confidentiality markings on documents. Read more: MicroStrategy v. Business Objects: A Field Manual for Reasonable Secrecy Measures ›
Why did some claimed trade secrets fail?: At least one (an internal CEO email) failed not for lack of security but for lack of value, because its contents were largely public or soon to be public. The court required both reasonable measures and independent economic value, evaluated separately for each item. Read more: MicroStrategy v. Business Objects: A Field Manual for Reasonable Secrecy Measures ›
Did MicroStrategy ultimately recover damages?: No. The district court found misappropriation and issued an injunction, but it had already granted partial summary judgment denying damages because MicroStrategy did not show its damages with reasonable certainty or a causal connection to Business Objects' conduct. The Federal Circuit affirmed that denial in 2005. Read more: MicroStrategy v. Business Objects: A Field Manual for Reasonable Secrecy Measures ›
Was Mission Capital really the first DTSA seizure order?: It is widely described as the first civil seizure order issued under § 1836(b)(2), entered roughly two and a half months after the DTSA took effect in May 2016. That distinction is why the case is so heavily cited despite its brief, fact-specific order. Read more: Mission Capital Advisors v. Romaka: The First DTSA Seizure, and Why It Took a TRO to Fail First ›
Why did the court grant seizure here when other early courts refused it?: Because the ordinary remedy had been tried and had failed. The court first issued a TRO; only after the defendant evaded personal service five times and failed to appear (rendering Rule 65 relief unenforceable) did the court authorize seizure. In Brunswick and Balearia, by contrast, a TRO still appeared adequate, so seizure was denied. Read more: Mission Capital Advisors v. Romaka: The First DTSA Seizure, and Why It Took a TRO to Fail First ›
What was actually seized?: Only the contact lists, identified as two named files on a Lenovo desktop at the defendant's apartment. The marshals were directed to copy those files onto a storage medium and delete them from the computer, not to take the computer. The court denied without prejudice the request to seize Mission Capital's other proprietary information for lack of particularity, so the order matched the statute's command that a seizure be the narrowest necessary. Read more: Mission Capital Advisors v. Romaka: The First DTSA Seizure, and Why It Took a TRO to Fail First ›
Does the Defend Trade Secrets Act apply to misappropriation that happens overseas?: Yes, within limits. The Seventh Circuit held the DTSA can reach foreign misappropriation when an act in furtherance of the offense occurs in the United States, drawing on the Economic Espionage Act provision the DTSA amended. Advertising stolen-technology products at U.S. trade shows qualified. Read more: Trade Shows as a Toehold: Motorola v. Hytera and the DTSA's Reach Across Borders ›
How large was the award and what happened to it on appeal?: The court affirmed roughly $407 million under the DTSA, comprising about $135.8 million in compensatory damages and $271.6 million in punitive damages, based partly on Hytera's worldwide sales. It separately reversed in part on the $136.3 million copyright award and remanded for recalculation limited to domestic sales. The Supreme Court denied Hytera's certiorari petition on February 24, 2025, so the DTSA award stands. Read more: Trade Shows as a Toehold: Motorola v. Hytera and the DTSA's Reach Across Borders ›
What is the practical takeaway for foreign companies?: Even limited U.S. activity, such as marketing or attending trade shows with products built on stolen secrets, can trigger DTSA liability measured by global sales. Foreign firms cannot assume that keeping the actual theft abroad shields them from U.S. trade-secret damages. Read more: Trade Shows as a Toehold: Motorola v. Hytera and the DTSA's Reach Across Borders ›
Why did nClosures lose despite having a signed confidentiality agreement?: The Seventh Circuit held that under Illinois law a confidentiality agreement is enforceable only when the company also takes reasonable steps to keep the information secret. nClosures did not mark its designs confidential, lock them up, restrict computer access, or require NDAs from everyone who saw them, so the agreement was unenforceable. Read more: A Signature Is Not a Strategy: nClosures v. Block and Why an NDA Alone Won't Save Your Secrets ›
What 'reasonable measures' were missing in nClosures v. Block?: The court pointed to several gaps: the design files were not marked confidential or proprietary, they were not kept under lock and key, they were not stored on access-restricted computers, and individuals who accessed them were not required to sign their own confidentiality agreements. Read more: A Signature Is Not a Strategy: nClosures v. Block and Why an NDA Alone Won't Save Your Secrets ›
Does this case apply only to trade secrets?: Its core lesson reaches contract claims too. The court treated the enforceability of the confidentiality agreement itself as turning on whether reasonable secrecy efforts were made, so even a breach-of-contract theory failed when the underlying information was not actually protected. Read more: A Signature Is Not a Strategy: nClosures v. Block and Why an NDA Alone Won't Save Your Secrets ›
Does a DTSA plaintiff have to prove the defendant copied the trade secret?: No. Oakwood holds that "use" reaches all the ways a party takes advantage of trade-secret information for economic benefit or competitive advantage, including accelerating research or development. Replication of the secret or a finished competing product is not required. Read more: Oakwood Laboratories v. Thanoo: What It Takes to Plead 'Use' Under the DTSA ›
Why did the Third Circuit vacate the dismissal after four tries?: It concluded the district court had effectively imposed a heightened pleading standard (demanding proof-like detail about how the secret was used) that neither the DTSA nor ordinary plausibility pleading requires. Read more: Oakwood Laboratories v. Thanoo: What It Takes to Plead 'Use' Under the DTSA ›
Is Oakwood binding nationwide?: No. It binds courts in the Third Circuit and is persuasive elsewhere, but its broad reading of "use" is widely cited across jurisdictions in DTSA litigation. Read more: Oakwood Laboratories v. Thanoo: What It Takes to Plead 'Use' Under the DTSA ›
Can a food recipe be a trade secret?: Yes, but only if it satisfies the ordinary trade secret requirements. The recipe must give the owner a competitive advantage, contain enough originality to be more than common knowledge, and be the subject of reasonable efforts to keep it secret. A recipe made only of common ingredients in ordinary proportions usually fails. Read more: Peggy Lawton Kitchens v. Hogan: When a Cookie Recipe Is a Trade Secret ›
Did listing 'nut meal' on the package destroy the secret?: No. The Appeals Court held that naming the ingredient on a label was not publication of the recipe, because it disclosed nothing about the proportions used and did not even reveal what kind of nuts or what part of the nuts supplied the flavor. Ingredient lists identify what is in a product without giving away how to reproduce it. Read more: Peggy Lawton Kitchens v. Hogan: When a Cookie Recipe Is a Trade Secret ›
Why did the later contempt petition fail?: In the 1989 Supreme Judicial Court decision, the Hogans had stopped using nut meal and added vanilla, giving their cookies a distinctive vanilla flavor, and they changed the formula in other ways as well. Civil contempt requires clear and undoubted disobedience of a clear and unequivocal command. The injunction, which the Appeals Court had described as forbidding only use of the plaintiff's precise formula, did not clearly reach a recipe that was merely substantially derived from it, and the court expressly left open how far the decree went. Read more: Peggy Lawton Kitchens v. Hogan: When a Cookie Recipe Is a Trade Secret ›
Did PepsiCo have to prove Redmond actually stole or disclosed secrets?: No. That is the core of the decision. PepsiCo prevailed by showing it was likely that Redmond's new duties would inevitably lead him to use or disclose PCNA's strategic and operating plans: threatened, not accomplished, misappropriation. Read more: PepsiCo v. Redmond: The Case That Built the Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine ›
Is the inevitable disclosure doctrine the law everywhere?: No. It has been adopted in varying forms in several states and rejected in others. California, in Whyte v. Schlage Lock Co. (2002), expressly refused to recognize it because it functions as a judicially imposed non-compete, which California law forbids. Read more: PepsiCo v. Redmond: The Case That Built the Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine ›
Does this mean an employee can be blocked from any competing job?: Not in itself. Redmond turned on specific facts: highly sensitive, current strategic plans, near-identical roles at a direct competitor, and doubts about the employee's candor. Courts that apply the doctrine generally require a similarly strong showing, not a mere overlap in industry. Read more: PepsiCo v. Redmond: The Case That Built the Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine ›
What did the Ninth Circuit hold in Quintara v. Ruifeng?: It held that the federal Defend Trade Secrets Act does not require a plaintiff to identify its trade secrets with reasonable particularity before discovery begins. Whether a secret is identified with sufficient particularity is a question of fact for summary judgment or trial, not a gatekeeping requirement at the outset. Read more: No Particularity at the Starting Line: Quintara Biosciences v. Ruifeng and DTSA Identification ›
How does this differ from California state law?: California's Code of Civil Procedure Section 2019.210 requires a trade-secret plaintiff suing under state law to identify its secrets with reasonable particularity before commencing discovery. The Ninth Circuit held that this state rule does not import into a federal DTSA claim. Read more: No Particularity at the Starting Line: Quintara Biosciences v. Ruifeng and DTSA Identification ›
What happened to Quintara's claims?: The district court had struck nine of Quintara's eleven claimed trade secrets at the discovery stage for lack of particularity, and a jury later returned a verdict for the defendants on the one secret still at issue. The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded: it held the district court abused its discretion by striking the nine secrets before discovery developed them, while leaving the denial of Quintara's mistrial motion undisturbed. Read more: No Particularity at the Starting Line: Quintara Biosciences v. Ruifeng and DTSA Identification ›
What is a legitimate business interest under Reliable Fire?: It is the employer's protectable stake, such as near-permanent customer relationships or confidential information, that a restrictive covenant may guard. After Reliable Fire, Illinois courts decide whether one exists by weighing the totality of the circumstances rather than applying a fixed checklist, so no single factor is dispositive. Read more: Reliable Fire v. Arredondo: Non-Competes and the Legitimate Business Interest ›
Did Reliable Fire make non-competes easier or harder to enforce in Illinois?: Neither automatically. It replaced rigid appellate tests with a flexible, fact-intensive inquiry. That gives employers a path to show a legitimate interest on strong facts, but it also denies them a mechanical formula and forces case-by-case proof, which can cut against overbroad covenants. Read more: Reliable Fire v. Arredondo: Non-Competes and the Legitimate Business Interest ›
Does a legitimate business interest alone make a non-compete enforceable?: No. The interest is a threshold. The covenant must still be reasonable in time, geographic scope, and activity restrained, must not impose undue hardship on the employee, and must not injure the public. Reliable Fire preserved that full reasonableness framework. Read more: Reliable Fire v. Arredondo: Non-Competes and the Legitimate Business Interest ›
Why did REXA lose its trade-secret claim against its former engineer?: The Seventh Circuit held that REXA had not identified a concrete trade secret. Its claimed secret was an abandoned 2002 actuator prototype and broad technology areas, and the court found no reasonable jury could infer that the engineer used that shelved design in a product he developed more than a decade later. Read more: REXA v. Chester: A Shelved Prototype Is Not a Trade Secret a Decade Later ›
Does trade-secret law protect broad technology areas or general design approaches?: No. The court required a high level of specificity, holding that broad categories of technology are not concrete trade secrets. A plaintiff must identify the particular protected information with precision, not gesture at a general field or an abandoned research direction. Read more: REXA v. Chester: A Shelved Prototype Is Not a Trade Secret a Decade Later ›
How does the age of a claimed trade secret affect a misappropriation case?: Age matters to the reasonableness of the inference of use. In REXA the court found the inference that the engineer used knowledge of a prototype from eleven years earlier was barely conceivable and exceptionally unreasonable, which helped defeat the claim on summary judgment. Read more: REXA v. Chester: A Shelved Prototype Is Not a Trade Secret a Decade Later ›
Did Rockwell win the case?: Not outright. The Seventh Circuit reversed summary judgment for the defendants and remanded for further proceedings. The holding was that Rockwell's precautions could not be deemed unreasonable as a matter of law, not that they were conclusively reasonable. Read more: Rockwell v. DEV Industries: Posner Makes Secrecy a Cost-Benefit Problem ›
Does a trade-secret owner have to keep information perfectly secret?: No. The court said that perfect security is not optimum security, because excessive precautions can be economically irrational. The owner must take precautions that are reasonable under the circumstances, judged by weighing their costs against their benefits. Read more: Rockwell v. DEV Industries: Posner Makes Secrecy a Cost-Benefit Problem ›
Why does it matter how much a company spent protecting information?: Posner identified two reasons. The level of precaution signals how valuable the information really is, and strong precautions make it less likely a competitor acquired the information innocently. Both bear directly on whether a remedy is warranted. Read more: Rockwell v. DEV Industries: Posner Makes Secrecy a Cost-Benefit Problem ›
Did Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto hold that trade secrets are property?: Yes. The Court held that to the extent a trade secret is recognized as property under state law, it is "property" for purposes of the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause. Trade secrets, the Court reasoned, share many characteristics of more tangible property: they can be assigned, can form the res of a trust, and pass to a trustee in bankruptcy, and their owner enjoys the right to exclude. Read more: Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto: When a Trade Secret Becomes Fifth Amendment Property ›
Why did some of Monsanto's takings claims fail?: A taking turns on "reasonable investment-backed expectations." For data submitted between 1972 and 1978, FIFRA guaranteed confidentiality, so disclosure could be a taking. For data submitted after 1978, the statute expressly authorized EPA to use and disclose it, so Monsanto had no reasonable expectation of secrecy and no compensable taking occurred. Read more: Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto: When a Trade Secret Becomes Fifth Amendment Property ›
How is a trade secret different from patent property under this case?: The Court stressed that a trade secret's value depends on continued secrecy. Unlike a patent, which grants exclusivity even after public disclosure, a trade secret evaporates once the information becomes generally known. The property right is therefore "defined by the extent to which the owner of the secret protects his interest from disclosure to others." Read more: Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto: When a Trade Secret Becomes Fifth Amendment Property ›
Did the court declare all non-competes illegal or legal?: Neither. The court did not rule on whether non-competes are good or bad policy. It held only that the FTC lacked the legal authority to ban them by rule and that the rule failed APA reasoned-decision-making standards. The enforceability of any given non-compete continues to be governed by the law of the relevant state. Read more: When the National Non-Compete Ban Fell: Ryan LLC v. FTC and the Return to Trade-Secret Protection ›
Is the FTC's rule completely gone, or could it come back?: The rule has been formally removed from the Code of Federal Regulations, so it has no current legal effect. A future Commission could attempt a new rule, but it would confront the same authority problem the court identified, and would need a stronger statutory hook or different legal theory. Read more: When the National Non-Compete Ban Fell: Ryan LLC v. FTC and the Return to Trade-Secret Protection ›
What should employers rely on now to protect competitive information?: Trade-secret protection under the Defend Trade Secrets Act and state law, backed by robust confidentiality measures, plus narrowly drafted non-disclosure and non-solicitation agreements. These tools do not depend on the contested non-compete framework and remain fully available. Read more: When the National Non-Compete Ban Fell: Ryan LLC v. FTC and the Return to Trade-Secret Protection ›
Did a court decide that Shan misappropriated trade secrets?: Not in the first instance. An arbitrator found that Shan breached her agreement and fiduciary duties and misused Sabre's confidential and trade-secret information, including source code. The courts' role was to confirm or vacate that award, which they ultimately confirmed in full. Read more: Sabre GLBL v. Shan: Building a Competitor on the Clock, and Paying for the Head Start ›
What are "head start" damages?: They measure the value of the unlawful acceleration a defendant gains by using misappropriated information or breaching duties to reach the market faster than lawful competition would have allowed. Here the arbitrator awarded $1,173,318 on that theory, tied to the advantage Shan's competing company enjoyed. Read more: Sabre GLBL v. Shan: Building a Competitor on the Clock, and Paying for the Head Start ›
Why did the Third Circuit restore the attorney's fees?: The district court had vacated the arbitrator's fee award, but the court of appeals held that the award should stand, reversing that portion and directing confirmation of the arbitrator's final award in full. That outcome reflects the deference owed to arbitral decisions. Read more: Sabre GLBL v. Shan: Building a Competitor on the Clock, and Paying for the Head Start ›
Why could Sears legally copy Stiffel's successful lamp?: Because the trial court held Stiffel's patents invalid for want of invention. With no valid patent, the design was in the public domain, and federal policy gives the public the right to copy unpatented articles. Illinois could not override that with its unfair-competition law. Read more: Sears v. Stiffel: The Pole Lamp That Made Copying a Federal Right ›
Does this mean state unfair-competition law is dead?: No. Sears preserved the states' power to require truthful labeling and to prevent passing off or deception about a product's source. What states cannot do is prohibit the copying of an unpatented design merely because the copy looks like the original. Read more: Sears v. Stiffel: The Pole Lamp That Made Copying a Federal Right ›
How does Sears relate to trade-secret protection?: They are complementary. Trade-secret law (later upheld in Kewanee) protects only secret information and permits reverse engineering and independent invention, the same copying Sears protects. Once a design is publicly sold without a patent, Sears controls and copying is lawful; secrecy is the alternative that keeps competitors out. Read more: Sears v. Stiffel: The Pole Lamp That Made Copying a Federal Right ›
Does Silvaco mean a software vendor can never reach a competitor's customers?: Not categorically. It means a customer who merely licenses and runs compiled software, without acquiring or using the underlying source-code secrets, is not liable for misappropriation. A customer who obtains and exploits the source code itself, or who participates in the taking, stands differently. Read more: Object Code, Source Code, and the Outer Edge of Supersession: Silvaco v. Intel ›
Did Silvaco hold that CUTSA displaces all claims about confidential information?: It is most often read to displace common-law claims premised on the taking of information that does not qualify as a trade secret, on the theory that CUTSA occupies that field. But courts applying California law are divided on how far that reading extends, so the answer depends on the forum and the precise pleading. Read more: Object Code, Source Code, and the Outer Edge of Supersession: Silvaco v. Intel ›
How does Silvaco relate to K.C. Multimedia?: K.C. Multimedia established the "same nucleus of facts" displacement test; Silvaco applied it to conversion, conspiracy, and unfair competition, and extended the analysis to the harder question of non-trade-secret information while separately narrowing the "use" element of misappropriation. Read more: Object Code, Source Code, and the Outer Edge of Supersession: Silvaco v. Intel ›
Why did the Federal Circuit affirm without a written opinion?: The court used Rule 36 summary affirmance, which permits a judgment of affirmance without an opinion when the issues are adequately resolved by existing law. After TianRui, the panel evidently regarded the extraterritoriality question as settled, and it affirmed days after oral argument. Read more: Sino Legend v. ITC: A 10-Year Import Ban and the Limits of Comity ›
Did the contrary Chinese proceedings change the outcome?: No. Sino Legend urged the Commission and later the Supreme Court to account for parallel litigation in the Chinese courts, in which it fared better than at the ITC. The exclusion order nonetheless stood; the Supreme Court denied certiorari, leaving the U.S. import ban in place despite the foreign result. Read more: Sino Legend v. ITC: A 10-Year Import Ban and the Limits of Comity ›
What did the certiorari petition ask, and what did the denial mean?: Petition No. 16-428 asked whether Section 337 lets the ITC adjudicate trade-secret misappropriation occurring outside the United States, effectively asking the Court to reconsider TianRui. The January 9, 2017 denial set no binding precedent but left TianRui and the exclusion order undisturbed. Read more: Sino Legend v. ITC: A 10-Year Import Ban and the Limits of Comity ›
Did Dravo steal or improperly obtain the designs?: No. Dravo received the blueprints and data voluntarily, as part of legitimate acquisition negotiations. The misappropriation lay not in how Dravo acquired the information but in its subsequent use of that information to build competing containers, in breach of an implied duty of confidence. Read more: Smith v. Dravo: When Sale Talks Create a Duty of Confidence ›
Was there a written confidentiality agreement?: No. As the court put it, no express promise of trust was exacted from Dravo. Dravo's main argument was a different one, that public use and trade publicity had left no secret to protect. The Seventh Circuit held that the engineering details remained secret and that a confidential relationship could be implied from the circumstances of the disclosure, so no signed agreement was required to support liability. Read more: Smith v. Dravo: When Sale Talks Create a Duty of Confidence ›
What is the practical lesson for companies exploring a sale or merger?: Disclosures made to evaluate a transaction can carry implied use restrictions, but relying on implication is risky. Sellers should require a written nondisclosure and non-use agreement before opening a data room, and buyers should recognize that information received in diligence may not be free for competitive use. Read more: Smith v. Dravo: When Sale Talks Create a Duty of Confidence ›
What is a DTSA ex parte seizure?: Under 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(2), the Defend Trade Secrets Act lets a trade-secret owner ask a court, without notifying the defendant, to order federal marshals to seize property necessary to prevent the propagation or dissemination of the trade secret. It is an extraordinary remedy reserved for cases where an ordinary injunction would be inadequate. Read more: Solar Connect v. Endicott: When a Court Grants a DTSA Civil Seizure ›
Why did the court grant seizure in Solar Connect v. Endicott?: The court found the defendants had a high level of technical proficiency, had previously deleted data from computers, and had used false identities and misleading information to conceal themselves. Those facts showed they would likely evade or disobey an ordinary Rule 65 order, which is the core statutory requirement for civil seizure. Read more: Solar Connect v. Endicott: When a Court Grants a DTSA Civil Seizure ›
Are DTSA seizures common?: No. Civil seizures under the DTSA are rare because the statute requires extraordinary circumstances and a showing that lesser remedies like a temporary restraining order would not work. Solar Connect is notable precisely because it is one of the few reported cases where a court granted the seizure rather than ordering a TRO instead. Read more: Solar Connect v. Endicott: When a Court Grants a DTSA Civil Seizure ›
Can you recover trade-secret damages if the defendant never sold anything?: Yes. StorageCraft v. Kirby confirms that a reasonable royalty is available for the use or disclosure of a secret. Disclosing it to a competitor is itself a compensable injury, regardless of whether the defendant earned profits. Read more: StorageCraft v. Kirby: A Reasonable Royalty Even When the Thief Never Profited ›
How is a reasonable royalty calculated?: It approximates what a willing licensor and licensee would have negotiated for the right the defendant wrongfully took. Expert licensing testimony typically anchors the figure, but the jury may weigh that evidence and award less, as it did here. Read more: StorageCraft v. Kirby: A Reasonable Royalty Even When the Thief Never Profited ›
What is the relationship between the royalty and the exemplary damages?: The reasonable royalty was the compensatory base ($2.92 million). Because the jury found the conduct willful and malicious, the court added exemplary damages (about $1.46 million), within the uniform act's cap of twice the compensatory award. Read more: StorageCraft v. Kirby: A Reasonable Royalty Even When the Thief Never Profited ›
What are "avoided costs" in a trade-secret case?: They are the development or research-and-development expenses a misappropriator did not have to incur because it took the information instead of creating it. They are treated as a form of unjust enrichment under the DTSA. Read more: Syntel v. TriZetto: The Limits of 'Avoided Costs' as DTSA Damages ›
Why did the Second Circuit vacate the avoided-cost award?: Because Syntel's only unjust gain, roughly $823,899 in profits from servicing one customer, was already addressed in computing TriZetto's actual loss, and beyond its lost profits TriZetto showed no compensable harm. The DTSA allows unjust-enrichment damages only for gains "not addressed in computing damages for actual loss." Read more: Syntel v. TriZetto: The Limits of 'Avoided Costs' as DTSA Damages ›
Does Syntel eliminate avoided-cost damages under the DTSA?: No. The court's holding is fact-specific. Avoided costs remain a recognized unjust-enrichment measure; they are simply unavailable where the defendant's gain is already addressed in computing the owner's actual loss and the owner shows no compensable harm beyond its lost profits. Read more: Syntel v. TriZetto: The Limits of 'Avoided Costs' as DTSA Damages ›
Does Sysco require a plaintiff to disclose its trade secret publicly to plead a claim?: No. The court distinguishes between identifying a secret with enough particularity to give notice and assess plausibility, and revealing its protected substance to the world. A plaintiff can describe the contours and category of the asserted information specifically without publishing the secret itself; what it cannot do is substitute sweeping labels for identification. Read more: When 'Everything Is a Trade Secret' Is Nothing: Sysco Machinery v. DCS USA ›
Why did information registered with the Copyright Office defeat the trade-secret claim?: Because trade-secret protection depends on secrecy, and the panel held that depositing the technical drawings, unredacted, with the Copyright Office extinguished their secret status. Once information is in the public record, it no longer derives independent economic value from not being generally known. Read more: When 'Everything Is a Trade Secret' Is Nothing: Sysco Machinery v. DCS USA ›
Is the Fourth Circuit now stricter than other circuits on trade-secret pleading?: It is at the more demanding end. Sysco insists on particularity at the pleading stage and ties it directly to Twombly/Iqbal plausibility, whereas several courts (most visibly the Ninth Circuit) allow identification to be refined through discovery. The result is a recognized split that makes forum and pleading strategy consequential. Read more: When 'Everything Is a Trade Secret' Is Nothing: Sysco Machinery v. DCS USA ›
Why did the Federal Circuit say the jury could not award disgorgement?: Disgorgement of a defendant's profits is an equitable remedy that, historically, was tried to a court rather than a jury. Under the Seventh Amendment's historical test, there was no jury-trial right on it, so the judge must determine the amount on remand. Read more: TAOS v. Renesas: Disgorgement, Apportionment, and the Head-Start Clock ›
What is a "head-start" damages period?: It is the time advantage the misappropriator gained by stealing information instead of obtaining it lawfully, in this case by reverse engineering. Disgorgement is limited to that window, which runs from the date the secret became properly accessible by lawful means and lasts as long as it would have taken the defendant to recreate the technology in its own products. Profits earned after the window closes are not attributable to the misappropriation. Read more: TAOS v. Renesas: Disgorgement, Apportionment, and the Head-Start Clock ›
Why was the entire award vacated when one secret survived?: Because the jury's monetary award was a single, unapportioned sum based on all three asserted secrets. Liability could properly rest on only one of the three, and TAOS's expert had assigned all profits to all three without separating them, so the court had no basis to conclude the surviving secret supported the entire award. It vacated and remanded for new findings. Read more: TAOS v. Renesas: Disgorgement, Apportionment, and the Head-Start Clock ›
What did Teradyne v. Clear Communications actually decide?: The court dismissed the complaint and gave Teradyne twenty-one days to replead. It held that alleging former employees knew Teradyne's trade secrets and went to work for a competitor in the same field, without more, did not state a claim. A plaintiff must allege facts showing a high probability of inevitable and imminent use. Read more: Teradyne v. Clear Communications: The Limits of Inevitable Disclosure ›
How does Teradyne relate to PepsiCo v. Redmond?: Teradyne came first, in 1989, and supplied the analytical vocabulary of inevitability. When the Seventh Circuit embraced inevitable disclosure in PepsiCo v. Redmond in 1995, it built on Teradyne's framework but found the demanding facts present there that Teradyne found missing. Read more: Teradyne v. Clear Communications: The Limits of Inevitable Disclosure ›
Can a plaintiff win on inevitable disclosure under Teradyne?: Yes, but only on strong facts. The court indicated the claim would survive if the plaintiff alleged that the competitor intended to use the secrets, that the employees disavowed their confidentiality obligations, or that the competitor could not operate without the plaintiff's secrets. Read more: Teradyne v. Clear Communications: The Limits of Inevitable Disclosure ›
Did TianRui hold that U.S. trade-secret law applies in China?: No. The court held that a federal standard defines misappropriation for purposes of Section 337, and that the Commission may consider conduct occurring abroad in deciding whether an unfair act in importation occurred. The remedy reaches only goods imported into the United States; it does not regulate the respondent's conduct within China. Read more: TianRui v. ITC: How Section 337 Reached a Theft That Happened in China ›
Why didn't the presumption against extraterritoriality bar the claim?: The majority gave three reasons. Section 337 is expressly aimed at unfair acts in the importation of articles into the United States, so it is not a statute enacted with only domestic concerns in mind; its focus is an inherently international transaction. The Commission had not sanctioned purely foreign conduct, because the theft in China mattered only insofar as it produced imports causing domestic injury, and the remedy was wholly domestic. And the legislative history of the 'unfair methods of competition' language supported a broad reading. So applying the statute to bar tainted imports was not an impermissible extraterritorial application, even though the underlying theft happened in China. Read more: TianRui v. ITC: How Section 337 Reached a Theft That Happened in China ›
What relief did Amsted obtain?: The Commission found a Section 337 violation and issued a limited exclusion order barring importation of unlicensed cast steel railway wheels manufactured using Amsted's misappropriated ABC process. The Federal Circuit affirmed the Commission's determination. Read more: TianRui v. ITC: How Section 337 Reached a Theft That Happened in China ›
Why did TLS lose even though an employee took company information?: The First Circuit held that TLS never proved its claimed tax materials were actual trade secrets: it never identified them with the required specificity, and it offered no evidence that its strategy was beyond ready ascertainment from public sources. Separately, its nondisclosure agreements were so broad they were unenforceable. Taking information is not enough if the information is not a protectable secret and the contract that protects it is void. Read more: When an NDA Tries to Lock Up Everything: TLS Management v. Rodríguez-Toledo and the Overbroad Confidentiality Trap ›
How can a nondisclosure agreement be 'too broad'?: The court identified three ways: when it bars an employee from using general knowledge and skills, when it covers information that is actually public, and when it reaches information the employee got from third parties. An NDA that does any of these can operate like an illegal noncompete and become unenforceable. Read more: When an NDA Tries to Lock Up Everything: TLS Management v. Rodríguez-Toledo and the Overbroad Confidentiality Trap ›
Does this mean NDAs are unenforceable in the First Circuit?: No. Properly drafted NDAs that protect genuinely confidential information remain enforceable. The lesson is to define the protected information narrowly and tie it to real secrets, not to sweep in everything an employee learns on the job. Read more: When an NDA Tries to Lock Up Everything: TLS Management v. Rodríguez-Toledo and the Overbroad Confidentiality Trap ›
Is Turret Labs binding precedent?: No. It is a non-precedential summary order of the Second Circuit. It is widely cited as persuasive authority for how the "reasonable measures" element applies to software functionality, but it does not bind lower courts. Read more: Turret Labs v. CargoSprint: When Locking the Windows Isn't Enough ›
Did the court decide whether CargoSprint did anything wrong?: No. The court never reached the propriety of CargoSprint's access or its alleged reverse engineering. The claim failed at the threshold because Turret had not plausibly alleged a protectable secret: it had not taken reasonable measures to keep the functionality secret. Read more: Turret Labs v. CargoSprint: When Locking the Windows Isn't Enough ›
What single step would most likely have changed the outcome?: Alleging an enforceable confidentiality obligation binding Lufthansa and the freight forwarders who could use Dock EnRoll. The decisive gap was that the parties who could actually see the secret were not pleaded to be bound to keep it. Read more: Turret Labs v. CargoSprint: When Locking the Windows Isn't Enough ›
What is the reasonable-royalty measure of trade-secret damages?: It is the price a willing buyer and willing seller would have negotiated for a license to use the trade secret at the time of misappropriation. The Fifth Circuit endorsed it as a flexible measure that captures the value of what the defendant took even when conventional lost profits cannot be proven. Read more: What a Willing Buyer Would Pay: University Computing v. Lykes-Youngstown and the Reasonable Royalty ›
Why did University Computing need a flexible damages rule?: Because the defendant had not yet profitably sold the stolen inventory system, the plaintiff could not easily show lost sales or the defendant's gains. The court held that damages can still be measured by the value of the secret to the defendant at the moment it was taken, using a reasonable royalty. Read more: What a Willing Buyer Would Pay: University Computing v. Lykes-Youngstown and the Reasonable Royalty ›
Is this case still influential today?: Yes. Courts applying the Defend Trade Secrets Act and state uniform acts still treat University Computing as a foundational authority on reasonable-royalty and value-based damages, and recent Fifth Circuit decisions continue to cite it. Read more: What a Willing Buyer Would Pay: University Computing v. Lykes-Youngstown and the Reasonable Royalty ›
What is DTSA whistleblower immunity?: Under 18 U.S.C. § 1833(b), an individual cannot be held liable under any federal or state trade-secret law for disclosing a trade secret in confidence to a government official or to an attorney solely for the purpose of reporting or investigating a suspected violation of law, or in a sealed court filing. Read more: Unum Group v. Loftus: The First Test of DTSA Whistleblower Immunity ›
Why did the immunity defense fail in Unum Group v. Loftus?: The court treated § 1833(b) as an affirmative defense rather than a pleading-stage bar. Under the First Circuit's Rodi standard, such a defense supports dismissal only where the facts establishing it are definitively ascertainable from the complaint. Because Loftus had filed no lawsuit and the complaint did not establish that he took the documents solely to report a suspected violation, the record could not support or reject the defense at that stage. Read more: Unum Group v. Loftus: The First Test of DTSA Whistleblower Immunity ›
Does Loftus mean whistleblowers are unprotected under the DTSA?: No. It means immunity ordinarily must be proven with evidence rather than assumed from the pleadings. An employee who documents that a disclosure went only to counsel or a government official, solely to report suspected illegality, can still establish immunity, but may have to litigate to do so. Read more: Unum Group v. Loftus: The First Test of DTSA Whistleblower Immunity ›
How did Agrawal differ from Aleynikov if both stole trading code?: The medium of the theft. Sergey Aleynikov uploaded Goldman Sachs source code to a server and downloaded it, an electronic transfer the Second Circuit held was not the theft of a tangible good under the National Stolen Property Act and not covered by the EEA as then written. Samarth Agrawal printed thousands of pages of Societe Generale's code and carried the paper home. The Second Circuit held the paper was a tangible good satisfying the NSPA, and that the EEA element was met because the code related to securities traded in interstate commerce. Read more: United States v. Agrawal: When Printing the Code Made It a Crime ›
Did Agrawal overrule Aleynikov?: No. The panel distinguished Aleynikov rather than overruling it. Aleynikov remained good law on its facts, that purely electronic transfer of intangible code did not satisfy the statutes as then written. Agrawal turned on the different fact that the defendant reduced the code to physical paper, which the court treated as the theft of a tangible thing. The two decisions together mapped a line drawn by the medium of the theft. Read more: United States v. Agrawal: When Printing the Code Made It a Crime ›
What did Congress do in response to these cases?: After Aleynikov exposed the gap, Congress passed the Theft of Trade Secrets Clarification Act of 2012, amending 18 U.S.C. 1832 to cover trade secrets related to a product or service used in or intended for use in interstate or foreign commerce, not just products produced for such commerce. That change was meant to ensure internal software like trading systems is covered regardless of the medium of theft, closing the loophole the two prosecutions revealed. Read more: United States v. Agrawal: When Printing the Code Made It a Crime ›
Why was Aleynikov's conviction reversed if he took the code?: The Second Circuit assumed he took it but held that the 1996 EEA reached only trade secrets "related to or included in a product that is produced for or placed in interstate or foreign commerce." Goldman never sold or licensed its HFT system, so the code was not such a product, and the conduct fell outside the statute. Read more: United States v. Aleynikov: When Stolen Source Code Fell Outside the EEA ›
Did this case change the law?: Yes, indirectly. Congress responded with the Theft of Trade Secrets Clarification Act of 2012, which amended § 1832 to cover trade secrets related to a product or service "used in or intended for use in" commerce, language that now reaches internal-use software like Goldman's. Read more: United States v. Aleynikov: When Stolen Source Code Fell Outside the EEA ›
Could the same conduct be prosecuted today?: Almost certainly. Under the amended statute, code a firm uses internally to conduct interstate or foreign commerce qualifies, eliminating the gap that produced the reversal. Read more: United States v. Aleynikov: When Stolen Source Code Fell Outside the EEA ›
What made United States v. Chung historically significant?: It produced the first conviction obtained at trial under Section 1831 of the Economic Espionage Act of 1996, the provision targeting trade-secret theft intended to benefit a foreign government. The Ninth Circuit's affirmance was also the first appellate decision to reach the merits of a Section 1831 prosecution. Read more: Secrets Beneath the House: United States v. Chung and the First Economic Espionage Trial Conviction ›
Did Chung steal anything to sell for personal profit?: The government's theory was not ordinary commercial theft. It charged that Chung gathered Boeing and Rockwell aerospace documents to benefit the People's Republic of China, which is what triggered the foreign-government provision rather than the ordinary commercial-theft provision of the Act. Read more: Secrets Beneath the House: United States v. Chung and the First Economic Espionage Trial Conviction ›
How long was Chung's sentence?: The district court imposed 188 months in prison after a bench trial. Chung, then in his seventies, challenged the convictions and sentence on appeal, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed in 2011. Read more: Secrets Beneath the House: United States v. Chung and the First Economic Espionage Trial Conviction ›
Why was Jin convicted of theft but acquitted of espionage?: The two charges require different intent. Theft under § 1832 needs intent to convert and injure the owner; economic espionage under § 1831 additionally requires intent or knowledge that the offense will benefit a foreign government. The court found the foreign-benefit intent unproven beyond a reasonable doubt. Read more: United States v. Hanjuan Jin: The Proof Gap Between Theft and Espionage ›
Did her ties to a Chinese military-linked company prove espionage?: Not beyond a reasonable doubt. Judge Castillo found it more likely than not that Jin intended to benefit the Chinese government, and applied a sentencing enhancement on that basis, but he was not persuaded to the criminal standard and so acquitted on the § 1831 counts. Read more: United States v. Hanjuan Jin: The Proof Gap Between Theft and Espionage ›
What did the Seventh Circuit decide?: It affirmed the § 1832 convictions and the sentence. Judge Posner held that iDEN information could be a trade secret even though the technology was being supplanted, because § 1839(3)(B) requires only potential economic value from secrecy, and that Jin knew the theft would injure Motorola. Read more: United States v. Hanjuan Jin: The Proof Gap Between Theft and Espionage ›
Does the EEA require the government to prove a real trade secret existed for an attempt charge?: No. In United States v. Hsu the Third Circuit held that legal impossibility is not a defense to attempt or conspiracy under the Economic Espionage Act, so the government need not prove that an actual trade secret existed or changed hands. What matters is the defendant's intent and belief that the information was a trade secret, plus a substantial step toward the crime. This is what allows undercover stings to use decoy or non-secret materials. Read more: United States v. Hsu: Legal Impossibility Is No Defense Under the EEA ›
Why did the defendants want the actual Taxol documents in discovery?: They argued that to defend an attempt charge they needed to see whether the materials the FBI used contained real trade secrets, on the theory that if no trade secret existed, no crime was possible. The Third Circuit rejected that logic. Because legal impossibility is not a defense, the actual secrecy of the sting documents was irrelevant to the attempt and conspiracy charges, so the defendants had no need for the underlying Taxol trade secrets on that theory. The court reversed the disclosure order and remanded, leaving the district court to decide by in camera review whether the redacted material was material to any other defense the defendants might raise. Read more: United States v. Hsu: Legal Impossibility Is No Defense Under the EEA ›
What is the difference between factual and legal impossibility here?: Factual impossibility, where circumstances unknown to the defendant make the intended crime impossible, has never been a defense to attempt. Legal impossibility, where the completed act would not be a crime, sometimes is. The Hsu court treated the absence of a real trade secret as, at most, a form of impossibility that does not excuse an attempt, because the defendant intended to steal what he believed was a trade secret and took substantial steps to do so. Read more: United States v. Hsu: Legal Impossibility Is No Defense Under the EEA ›
What did Anthony Levandowski plead guilty to?: He pleaded guilty to a single count of trade secret theft under 18 U.S.C. Section 1832, admitting he downloaded a confidential Google file intending to use it to benefit himself and Uber. Prosecutors dismissed the remaining counts as part of the plea. Read more: The Biggest Trade Secret Crime He Had Ever Seen: United States v. Levandowski ›
What sentence did he receive?: Judge William Alsup sentenced Levandowski to 18 months in prison and ordered him to pay a $95,000 fine and about $756,499 in restitution. Alsup called it the largest trade secret crime he had ever seen. Read more: The Biggest Trade Secret Crime He Had Ever Seen: United States v. Levandowski ›
Did he actually serve the sentence?: No. On January 20, 2021, President Donald Trump granted Levandowski a full pardon before he reported to prison, ending the criminal case without imprisonment. Read more: The Biggest Trade Secret Crime He Had Ever Seen: United States v. Levandowski ›
Why is Liew considered a milestone?: It was the first time a federal jury convicted a defendant of economic espionage under 18 U.S.C. § 1831, and the § 1831 convictions were affirmed on appeal, establishing that the statute's demanding foreign-benefit element can be proven to a criminal jury. The Ninth Circuit did reverse two related obstruction counts and vacate the sentence, and Liew was resentenced to 144 months in October 2018, but the economic-espionage convictions stand. Read more: United States v. Liew: The First Jury Conviction for Economic Espionage ›
What trade secret did Liew steal?: DuPont's proprietary chloride-route process for manufacturing titanium-dioxide white pigment: specifically the detailed engineering specifications and designs, which he sold to Chinese state-owned enterprises to build TiO2 factories. Read more: United States v. Liew: The First Jury Conviction for Economic Espionage ›
How did the government satisfy § 1831's foreign-benefit requirement?: Through evidence that Liew knew his counterparties were instrumentalities of the Chinese state and that the scheme was designed to fulfill the PRC's prioritized goal of developing indigenous chloride-route TiO2 technology. Read more: United States v. Liew: The First Jury Conviction for Economic Espionage ›
What is the difference between 18 U.S.C. § 1831 and § 1832?: Section 1832 punishes trade-secret theft intended to benefit someone other than the owner for economic gain. Section 1831 adds a foreign-sovereign element (intent or knowledge that the offense will benefit a foreign government, instrumentality, or agent) and carries higher penalties. You was convicted under both. Read more: United States v. Xiaorong You: A 168-Month Sentence and the Anatomy of Economic Espionage ›
Did the Sixth Circuit overturn the conviction?: No. The court affirmed all convictions on July 11, 2023. It vacated only the sentence and remanded for resentencing because the district court erred in calculating intended loss. Read more: United States v. Xiaorong You: A 168-Month Sentence and the Anatomy of Economic Espionage ›
Must the government prove the defendant knew the information was legally a "trade secret"?: No. Following United States v. Krumrei, the court held the government need only prove the defendant knew the information was proprietary and taken without authorization, not that she knew it satisfied the statutory definition or its precise value to a foreign sponsor. Read more: United States v. Xiaorong You: A 168-Month Sentence and the Anatomy of Economic Espionage ›
Does the Defend Trade Secrets Act apply to foreign companies?: Yes, in appropriate cases. vPersonalize holds that the DTSA's civil remedy reaches conduct outside the United States through 18 U.S.C. § 1837, so a foreign defendant can be sued when one of that section's conditions (a U.S.-tied offender or a domestic act in furtherance) is met. Read more: vPersonalize v. Magnetize: How a U.S. Court Reached a U.K. Defendant Under the DTSA ›
Must the foreign defendant itself commit the U.S. act?: No, according to this court. Judge Rothstein read § 1837(2) to require only that "an act in furtherance of the offense was committed in the United States," and held that the statute "does not require the defendant to have committed such act." A U.S.-based third party's conduct can supply the necessary domestic act. Read more: vPersonalize v. Magnetize: How a U.S. Court Reached a U.K. Defendant Under the DTSA ›
Is vPersonalize binding on other courts?: No. It is a district-court decision from the Western District of Washington and is persuasive rather than binding elsewhere. It is, however, an influential early civil reading of § 1837 and is frequently cited alongside other cross-border DTSA rulings. Read more: vPersonalize v. Magnetize: How a U.S. Court Reached a U.K. Defendant Under the DTSA ›
Why did Warner-Lambert have to keep paying royalties after the Listerine formula became public?: Because the 1881 contract tied the payment obligation to the manufacture and sale of Listerine, not to the continued secrecy of the formula. The court read the plain language as making royalties co-extensive with sales, so publication of the formula did not end the duty to pay. Read more: Warner-Lambert v. Reynolds: The Listerine Royalty That Never Ends ›
Does a trade-secret license automatically terminate when the secret becomes public?: No. Warner-Lambert holds that a trade-secret license's duration is governed by the contract's terms, not by the life of the secret. If the parties want payments to stop when secrecy ends, they must say so; absent that language, the obligation can be perpetual. Read more: Warner-Lambert v. Reynolds: The Listerine Royalty That Never Ends ›
How can drafters avoid a perpetual royalty like Listerine's?: Tie the payment obligation expressly to continued secrecy or set a fixed term. A clause providing that royalties cease if and when the licensed information enters the public domain, or after a defined number of years, prevents the open-ended liability the Listerine contract created. Read more: Warner-Lambert v. Reynolds: The Listerine Royalty That Never Ends ›
Can an employer stop a former employee from using knowledge the employee developed on the job?: Not on the facts of Wexler. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that where a chemist signed no confidentiality or non-compete agreement and personally developed the formulas, the employer could not claim them as trade secrets. The employee's general skill and knowledge belong to him, not the employer. Read more: Wexler v. Greenberg: An Employer Cannot Claim Its Chemist's Own Skill as a Secret ›
Why did the absence of a confidentiality agreement matter so much?: Trade-secret protection against a former employee rests on either an enforceable restrictive covenant or a confidential relationship that imposes a duty of secrecy. Because Greenberg had neither and had himself created the formulas, there was no legal basis to bar him from using that knowledge in his new job. Read more: Wexler v. Greenberg: An Employer Cannot Claim Its Chemist's Own Skill as a Secret ›
What is the practical lesson of Wexler v. Greenberg for employers?: Secure written confidentiality and, where lawful, non-compete or non-solicitation agreements before an employee develops sensitive know-how, and document what information the company treats as secret. Without those measures, an employer may be unable to prevent a departing employee from using knowledge gained on the job. Read more: Wexler v. Greenberg: An Employer Cannot Claim Its Chemist's Own Skill as a Secret ›
Why did California reject inevitable disclosure?: Because it operates as an after-the-fact covenant not to compete. The court held the doctrine conflicts with Business and Professions Code section 16600, which voids contracts restraining a person from engaging in a lawful profession, and with California's strong policy favoring employee mobility. Read more: California Slams the Door on Inevitable Disclosure: Whyte v. Schlage Lock ›
Can a California employer ever enjoin a departing employee?: Yes, but it must prove actual or threatened misappropriation of identified trade secrets, not merely that disclosure is likely because of the new role. Whyte preserved injunctive relief for genuine threatened misappropriation while barring the broader inevitable-disclosure shortcut. Read more: California Slams the Door on Inevitable Disclosure: Whyte v. Schlage Lock ›
What is a head-start injunction?: It is an injunction limited to the period of time the wrongdoer would have needed to develop the trade secret lawfully or independently. Rather than barring competition permanently, the court restrains the defendant only long enough to erase the unfair lead time the misappropriation produced. Read more: Winston Research v. 3M: The Origin of the Head-Start Injunction ›
Why did the Ninth Circuit limit the injunction to two years?: The court reasoned that the secrets would become public once 3M's product reached the market and that competitors could then reverse-engineer or independently develop the technology. The right measure was the time a legitimate competitor would need to build a comparable machine after that disclosure, and two years approximated it, so a longer or permanent injunction would over-protect 3M. Read more: Winston Research v. 3M: The Origin of the Head-Start Injunction ›
Did 3M recover damages as well as an injunction?: No. The district court granted the injunction but denied damages, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed both rulings as within the district court's discretion. Winston had sold no machines, so there were no profits to disgorge, evidence of future profits was speculative, and awarding damages on sales the injunction already barred would have been duplicative. Read more: Winston Research v. 3M: The Origin of the Head-Start Injunction ›

Educational content, not legal advice. These answers explain general legal concepts under U.S. law and are not a substitute for advice from a licensed attorney. Laws vary by jurisdiction and change over time.